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Abstract: This study describes how economic policies in Latin America are 
informed by, and have affected, social norms regarding equality and solidarity.  Through 
the rise and fall of institutions such as cooperatives and unions, and via social policy in 
education, health, and pensions, one can trace the ebb and flow of social solidarity as a 
justifiable socioeconomic policy aim in Latin America.  As a result of the decrease in the 
legitimacy of social solidarity and equality that follows the implementation of 
neoliberalism, a new social movement in the region- the Solidarity Economy- has 
emerged to reestablish these values.  However, it is largely borrowing from a tradition of 
associativism and other private-sector civil-society initiatives rather than vying directly 
for State power to institute its goals from within the polity.  I provide a case study of the 
 vi 
Santiago Solidarity Economy Network, in which I analyze their strategies of 
consciousness-raising and participation.  The case study also explores generational and 
institutional differences within the Network that stem from varied political experiences of 
neoliberal policy.  Finally, the case study details the obstacles to growth that this Network 
encounters, with a particular focus on those challenges that have emerged as a result of 
neoliberal policy and its’ effects on social norms of solidarity.    
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Introduction: Social Norms in the Making of an Economy 
 
Social norms and types of economic practice mutually inform each respective 
world of human action. Society is not separate from the economy; what we do for work 
and how we behave and relate to our families, neighbors, and communities are not 
discrete phenomena.  In fact, the composition and operation of an economy is determined 
in part by the kinds of social relationships that economic actors value, or devalue; the 
converse is also true.  This study examines social principles and their relationship to the 
economy, with a particular focus on the norms of fairness embedded in the concept of 
social solidarity. 
This paper begins in Chapter 1 by describing how economic policy in Latin 
America in the last 50 years has both created, and reinforced, different conceptions of 
social solidarity.  Beginning with Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI), I explore the 
relative strength of different economic institutions- such as unions and cooperatives- and 
the social norms promoted by national governments through ISI policy.  I compare the 
social values embedded in this economic policy to the economic philosophy that 
followed: neoliberalism.  Using changing labor regulations, social welfare policy, and the 
decline of unions, I look at how the value of solidarity is decentered from national 
economic policy.  I trace the effects of these policies on cooperatives, showing how their 
numbers decrease and then increase in response to changing notions of national 
solidarity.  I also outline the role of international institutions in legitimizing certain social 
values in national economies. 
 2 
The following chapter applies the work of social economists, who study the 
interdependent relationship of societies, their values, and their economic practices.  I use 
their work to briefly trace the history of associativism, and the ways that this European 
practice merged with the social, informal and popular economies of Latin America.  I 
then explore how the perceived effects of neoliberal economic policy have prompted a 
new wave of social movements in Latin America, beginning with the World Social 
Forum (WSF).  Next I analyze how these histories of associativism, plural economies, 
and the WSF have converged to create a social movement, the Solidarity Economy, 
which is premised on reinserting social solidarity into contemporary economic behavior.   
Chapter 3 describes in further detail the trajectory of social solidarity in the 
context of ISI and neoliberalism in Chile.  I show how inequality has increased, taken on 
spatial elements, and informed the logic of government provision of social services.  
Then I explore the emergence of the Solidarity Economy Network of Santiago in Chile, 
connecting their grievances to the effects of the modernizing policies of ISI and 
neoliberalism described in prior chapters.   
In the last chapter I use interviews and participant observation to analyze various 
dimensions of the Solidarity Economy Network of Santiago as they relate to the 
implementation of neoliberalism and changes to that system that the Network wants to 
generate.  Therefore I assess participation mechanisms, consciousness-raising strategies, 
and spatial distribution of Network participants.  I explore the relationship of the Network 
to the State and its policies.  I also describe the generational, institutional and 
philosophical differences informed by Network participant‟s experience of neoliberal 
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policy under the dictatorship.  Finally, I detail the barriers and opportunities that the 
Network must confront to grow as an organization and fortify the value of social 






































Chapter 1: From ISI to Neoliberalism: Social Solidarity and Norms of Inequality in 
Latin America 
 
  Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) policies were an economic paradigm 
marked by nationalism, egalitarian social policies and redistribution of resources, both 
material and financial.  From the 1930s to the 1980s in Latin America, government 
intervention in the market was the keystone of policy.  Indeed, the government actively 
promoted economic growth through huge investments in public infrastructure as well as 
through subsidies if not outright ownership of industry (Massey et. al 2006). This resulted 
in relatively high rates of growth relative to the later neoliberal period (Walton 2004: 
168), and a development path linked to significant government involvement in selecting 
the types of economic goods to be produced domestically. 
ISI was also associated with collectively-oriented institutions of the working 
class.  It “encouraged the growth and consolidation of labor unions and labor backed 
parties” (Murillo 2005: 972), with these parties reaching the Presidency in Mexico, 
Argentina, Chile and Venezuela.  Land reform was initiated through the reallocation 
vehicle of the cooperative, and sometimes through nationalization of key industries.   
Furthermore ISI was also “underwritten by broad politico-ideological projects that 
encouraged the strengthening of the working class” and the political parties and 
associations supported by them (Sader 2008: 6).  The theme of equality was woven 
through both rural and urban initiatives to modernize the economy. 
 This resulted in norms of fairness that tended toward cooperation, solidarity, and a 
focus on social justice and egalitarianism.  The consolidation of collective-oriented 
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mechanisms of economic negotiation and redistribution such as unions and cooperatives 
further reinforced an ethic of social solidarity between and within historically 
marginalized socioeconomic classes.  The language of nationalism was intended to 
further fortify a group identity based on shared citizenship and the realization of the goal 
of industrialization. 
However, this macroeconomic project promoted a model of centralized State 
planning predicated on decision-making from the ministries to the masses (Taylor 2006: 
75); that is, without significant channels for participation from the bottom-up.  The 
working and popular classes were represented through a government that claimed to act 
in their interests, yet these social classes continued to be limited in their inclusion in 
processes of deliberation over economic policy.  Their voices were represented, but not 
heard directly.   
Furthermore, ISI privileged certain economic sectors over others.  While social 
policies of redistribution were designed to reach even the most impoverished segments of 
society, economic policies favored union industries and the manufacturing sector in 
general.  There remained a significant emphasis on the “monoeconomics” of Western 
thought that placed unequivocal value on industrialization.   Kuznets proposed that 
inequality would decrease as countries transitioned from rural agriculture to urban 
industry (Galbraith 2008: 7) with the help of liberal democratic governments with a 
penchant for egalitarian resource redistribution.  However, these policies were enacted at 
the expense of more labor-intensive commercial sectors (Hosseini 2003: 90), such as 
handmade goods and manually produced food products.  The value of goods produced by 
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hand and distributed on a smaller scale is socially defined. Consumers and producers 
come into closer contact with one another, and thus commerce is predicated on the 
familiarity of social relationships.  Industrialization policies supported associative 
economic practices, but only insofar as they aided in further modernizing the economy; 
that is, the social relationships embedded in economic practices were of secondary 
importance to the goal of industrialization.   The result was development that 
significantly transformed the socio-economic practices and relationships of many Latin 
Americans and in so doing, relegating the social structures predicated on them to a pre-
modern era.    
The economic arrangements of pre-industrial Latin America emerged in part to 
satisfy particular social needs. Indeed, the production of goods in an economy provides 
both material and social gratification. Universal human needs are often “social by their 
very nature, and the only means by which people can satisfy most universal needs are 
social means” (Hunt 2005: 425).  Industrialization processes targeted economic 
inequality without assessing the social function of pre-industrial types of economies.  
Therefore, to the extent that development is about addressing human need, it would be 
more effective and indeed, more useful if it took into account the social dimension of 
producing and using material goods as well as access to goods in and of themselves.   
Were this the case, alternative socioeconomic practices of many groups in Latin America 
would be more broadly evaluated according to the extent by which they fulfilled socio-
material ends.  While some in Latin America beginning in the 1950s indeed rejected the 
Western monoeconomic rhetoric of “progress” (Hosseini 2003: 101), that focused only 
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on the path towards producing and consuming certain types of industrial goods, import 
substitution policies founded on populist rhetoric failed to challenge the dominant 
narrative that marginalized alternative economic practices.   
Regardless, local and international elites in certain economic sectors perceived 
economic redistribution and government takeover of some industries as a threat.  Some of 
them responded with right-wing military coup d‟états.  Economically another orthodox 
paradigm was emerging in Washington D.C. and Europe in the 1980s, one that favored a 
return to individual responsibility and a small State.  These preferences were embodied in 
the development packages that developed nations pushed through as a conditions of loans 
to Latin America, loans needed to cope with the debt crisis, and were bolstered by their 
successful execution in the 1970s in Chile (Munoz 2008: x).  Moreover, the escalating 
ideological affinities of those in the North with the emerging dictatorships in the South 
further permitted the adoption of reforms.   
When Margaret Thatcher, the prime minister of England at the time, said “there is 
no such thing as community” she touched on one of the secondary objectives of reform- 
national social solidarity (Mkandawire 2007: 306).  In declaring that there is no 
community, Thatcher foreshadowed the world that neoliberal policy aimed to create.   
This is a world where government no longer embodied or assumed the social 
responsibilities of a community-oriented welfare state. The economic package of 
interventions that followed from this belief- this economic “shock therapy” as one of its 
architects, Milton Friedman, called it (Klein 2008: 2)- would come to be known as 
neoliberalism.  The weakening of norms of solidarity and an orientation to the 
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community as the result of economic liberalism and political authoritarianism is the focus 
of this chapter.  I will discuss these trends and their socioeconomic and political 
consequences to illuminate the sources of contention, strategies, and goals of the 
Solidarity Economy, a social movement arising in response to changing norms of social 
solidarity.    
 Social movement theory describes the onset of a movement in part according to 
the grievances it claims to have against the government.  I will focus on neoliberal policy 
as a governmental course of action that produced shared material and social grievances 
(Larana et.al 1994: 21).  I argue that these grievances are 1) a rupturing of collective 
institutions, 2) reduced ability to contest economic inequality in traditional ways, 
including through the State 3) diminished willingness or capacity of the State to provide 
for the social welfare of its citizens, which all originate from 4) an attack on social 
solidarity as a legitimate element of economic policy. 
The policies that prompted these grievances also condition the way in which 
social movements can respond to them.  The reorganization of unions and cooperatives 
and thus of oppositional political forces, the redistribution of opponents themselves into 
peripheral urban spaces, the acceleration and consolidation of economic orthodoxy, and 
the decentralization of the State precipitating the diffusion of the target of grievances are 
central to the grievances themselves. This chapter therefore will also focus on the 
reorganization of social spaces under neoliberalism in an attempt to later explain, in 
Chapter 2, the new geographic basis of social movements in Latin America, particularly 
the Solidarity Economy. 
 9 
Neoliberal Social Models and Foreign Influence 
Neoliberalism (or the Washington Consensus)  is defined by Massey as a policy 
of “balanced budgets, reduced taxes, decontrolled interest rates, floating exchange rates, 
liberalized trade relations, open foreign investment, deregulation and privatization” 
(Massey et. al 2006: 3).  The last of these four policy prescriptions relate directly to social 
models.  Social models are comprised of an employment and a welfare regime, and refer 
to the structuring and regulation of labor and social services vis-à-vis the market and the 
State (Fraile 2009: 229). The consequences of deregulation and privatization for the 
social models of Latin America most directly impacted traditional governmental and 
private sector institutions of social solidarity. Thus this chapter focuses on the social 
models, and the social dimensions, of neoliberalism. 
Neoliberalism‟s economic strength was in its ability to produce macroeconomic 
stability through fiscal-monetary policy (Walton 2004: 170).  The staggering inflation 
that plagued the region was highly disruptive to all social classes as the purchasing power 
of their wages fluctuated to extremes.  Neoliberal policy in this regard stabilized 
inflation, and led to “lower volatility of growth” (Walton 2004: 170), though Latin 
American countries were still then vulnerable to crises exacerbated by increased private 
financial flows (Walton 2004: 171). 
However, the social classes most negatively affected by these policies 
encountered a new State.  Firstly, decentralization fragmented the target of grievances.  
ISI policies produced a monolithic national government that was replaced by an 
assortment of public and private institutions operating on a more disperse institutional 
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and geographic terrain.  Therefore, reform-seekers were no longer able to direct their 
appeals for social or economic change towards a uniform State.  
More importantly, the new Latin American State was often no longer a 
democracy.  Privatization and decentralization would not have been possible, given the 
advances of the previous decades, “without first crushing the people‟s ability to defend 
their interests” (Sader 2008: 7).  In Chile, Pinochet was an early adopter of the neoliberal 
paradigm, beginning in 1973.  He enthusiastically embraced these reforms and, under the 
oft realized threat of political repression, applied them systematically and without the 
threat of political opposition present in a democratic government.  In Mexico and 
Argentina- considered alongside Chile to be consummate models for economic 
restructuring- reforms were also applied under undemocratic regimes.  Mexico was still 
under a one-party political system and Argentina, under a military dictatorship some 
considered to be even more systematically repressive than that of Chile, yet similarly 
disdainful of the political left and the social classes that supported it.  Brazil and 
Uruguay‟s democracies also fell to right-wing military dictatorships reacting to ISI 
policies and their ideologies (Sader 2008: 6).  It was the remarkable mobilization of 
social solidarity that preceded neoliberalism which this new economic policy took as its 
political target. 
The onset of the debt crisis in the early 1980s required many Latin American 
governments to seek loans from international financial institutions such as the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund.  These institutions employed individuals from 
the developed world considered to be “market fundamentalists” (Stiglitz 2009: 10), and 
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whose philosophy justified the conditions of loan dispersal (Massey et. al 2006).  This 
belief system held that freedom from government intervention in the economy- whether 
through taxes or regulation- and a lean State was the only legitimate course to 
modernization.  In fact, this ideology of austerity signified a “radical shift in the paradigm 
of development” (Moreno-Brid, et. al 2004: 346).  However, the historically unequal 
relationship between the developed and the developing world was not overturned, but 
extended through the requirements attached to loans needed due to the early 1980s debt 
crisis.  As Margheritis and Pereira (2007, 32) note, neoliberalism persuaded “subordinate 
states to accept certain rules of the game, this time reinforced by a new enforcement 
mechanism (financial conditionality).”  This new paradigm of development led to 
economic liberalization that positioned certain sectors of the local elite, now back in 
political power, to continue to capitalize on their historically accumulated economic 
privilege, albeit in a more thoroughly globalized context.  In fact, in many cases, 
neoliberalism has “sometimes succeeded only in transferring public monopolies to 
private hands” (Margheritis & Pereira 2007: 30).  Liberalization did not necessarily 
liberate resources and capital from elite control.  
Neoliberal policy not only required a retreat of the State but the revision of a 
nationally-based concept of community responsibility.  The shift from universal social 
service provision to selective targeting was a change that “has been conditioned by . . . 
the unraveling of “social pacts” behind various forms of universalism” (Mkandawire 
2007: 306) embodied in populist policies.  Collective accountability and shared resources 
under ISI were founded on an expansive notion of a national community.  Thus the 
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neoliberal preference for individual responsibility and privately-held individual resources 
also initiated a more restricted definition of national community. 
Neoliberal policy ignored important social realities of Latin American 
economies.  Firstly, the “interpretive schema” (Woolsey Biggart and Delbridge 2004: 31) 
through which economic relationships are understood were diverse and always had been 
(Braudel 1982 qtd. Massey et. al 2006).   That is to say, the way in which economic 
arrangements were justified was predicated on cultural beliefs regarding the relationship 
between families, neighbors, communities, outsiders, and the environment.  The 
reciprocal and solidarist systems of the region, culturally bound and rationalized and 
therefore distinct from Western capitalist systems, were rendered morally wrong 
(Woolsey Biggart and Delbridge 2004: 35).  Their substantive rationality- concerned with 
the social means of reaching a particular economic end- did not square with the 
instrumental rationality of neoliberalism.  One example of such a system is the 
agricultural ayllu of Peru, where economic arrangements follow from nuclei of families 
whose labor with other families produced goods to be distributed equally among all 
through a democratic political structure (MacLean 1958: 390) that “delegated tasks rather 
than power” (Aparicio 2008: 68).  Another example would be cargo systems of highland 
Chiapas, Mexico and many Central American countries where men seek voluntary year-
long offices in the community to host, at personal expense, important religious 
celebrations on behalf of all, and whose observance was a mechanism to maintain a local 
cultural economy (Cancian 1974: 164).  A third would be the well-documented social 
economy of urban areas where non-cash exchanges of often domestic tasks take place 
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and are premised on social solidarity- helping one another- as opposed to material gain 
(Gaughan & Ferman 1987: 21).  
Secondly, the Consensus failed to take into account the fact that markets are 
constituted by institutions and a body politic in part conditioned by its relationship to 
those institutions, and thus that in a context of political repression free markets can never 
be free.  Accordingly in Argentina, as in Mexico, government and the market were 
similarly corrupt (Massey et. al 2006), and in Chile Pinochet hid millions of dollars stolen 
from the government in Riggs banks with the assistance of the owners of those 
establishments (O‟Hara and Day 2004: 1). In fact, the very nature of neoliberal policy- 
adopted as a condition of loans from foreign institutions- makes national governments 
accountable to exterior bodies rather than their own citizens.  Emboldened by dictatorial 
rule, military dictatorships instituting neoliberal policies were doubly empowered to act 
with economic and political impunity.   
However, the Consensus theorists in Washington did not merely overlook the 
political authoritarian tradition in the region but in fact had long ago collaborated with 
local militaries to protect what it viewed as American economic interests.  The Alliance 
for Progress of the United States in the 1960s “strove to maintain military resources” in 
the region to protect against progressive policies of the left (DeRouen Jr, and Heo 2001: 
476).  In Latin America, more often than not, this military presence trained Latin 
American officers to target perceived domestic threats rather than foreign ones.  U.S. aid 
to the military was thus a tacit funding of State repression of the local population cloaked 
in the language of economic development (Michaels 1976: 76).  This policy of 
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conveniently overlooking authoritarianism in favor of economic liberalism would not be 
overturned in the neoliberal era. 
Employment Regimes: The Decline of Traditional Worker Collectivities  
Sanctioned authoritarianism of the political elite, coupled with reforms, led to a 
radical restructuring of labor that sharply departed from prior mobilizing efforts of the 
working classes. Skilled workers and public servants significantly lost position in the 
neoliberal period and turned to micro-entrepreneurship as the only formal employment 
available (Portes & Hoffman 2003: 44).  Also at considerable disadvantage post-reforms 
were the formal workers who reduced their share of employment from 60 to 20 percent 
(Portes and Hoffman 2003: 49).  The informal sector, already large in Latin America, 
absorbed these new micro-entrepreneurs as it ballooned during the neoliberal period and, 
as of 1998, came to include almost 50% of the working population (ILO/ LIMA 2000 
qtd. Portes & Hoffman 2003: 50). 
The changing composition of various socioeconomic classes is emblematic of the 
effects that reforms had on urban unions and their allied political parties.  Including de 
facto transformations of labor policy, the restructuring of labor would affect Brazil, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Chile, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Nicaragua and 
Venezuela;  in Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Mexico and Uruguay collective 
bargaining was completely decentralized (Fraile 2009: 220).  In Chile, unions were 
outlawed following Pinochet‟s assumption of power, and when they were legalized later 
in the 1970s, were only able to bargain collectively at the company-level.  In Argentina, 
collective bargaining was similarly outlawed, then decentralized (Maceira & Murillo 
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2001: 4), and in Mexico unions also experienced a decline.  From the late 1960s to the 
early 1970s unionization rates of the non-agricultural sector reached 29 percent in Chile, 
42 percent in Mexico, and 43 percent in Argentina (Maceira & Murillo 2001: 24).  In 
Mexico this level dropped to 20 percent by 2000, and in Argentina to 25 percent as of 
1995 (Rodrik 2001: 11).  In Chile the unionization rate has dropped to 11% as of this year 
(Sepúlveda 2010: 1).   
Neoliberal policies negatively affected unions in a number of ways. The rise in 
informal work and the decrease in manufacturing also produced a sizable reduction in the 
number of workers eligible to unionize (Maceira & Murillo 2001: 23). In industries of 
previously high union participation reforms provoked conflict between workers in the 
same sectors and significantly challenged efforts to maintain unions, and build them 
horizontally (Murillo 2001: 4).  Bargaining power was also significantly reduced, both 
explicitly, through changes in policies regarding the terms of collective bargaining, and 
implicitly, due to increased rates of job instability and unemployment (Murillo 2001: 5).  
Politically, diminished power of labor parties meant less representation in institutions that 
regulate issues relating to social services (Murillo 2001: 5) and thus restricted their ability 
to deliver enhanced wages and improved working conditions (Maceira & Murillo 2001: 
16). The only progressive labor reforms to be made in the region affected individual 
components of labor regulation, such as working conditions, and even these often went 
unenforced (Murillo & Schrank 2005: 992).   
In turn, the material gains of solidarity declined, as did the institutions charged 
with obtaining the rewards of union action through collective struggles.  As a result, 
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norms of fairness and distribution were generally superseded by an ethic of individualism 
and survival strategies limited to individual-level circumstances and capacities.  
Furthermore, these strategies left individuals without “participation in decision making in 
the workplace” (Rodrik 2001: 1) that trade unions offered.  Neoliberalism restructured 
economies, but also options for collective action and the framing strategies that 
accompany them, as economic collectivities based on class and the values of cooperation 
and solidarity that provided their foundation dissolved.  
Cooperative enterprises experienced major changes as well.  As cooperatives 
were associated with projects of land reform, neoliberal policies that halted redistribution 
of land and privatized it also led to the dissolution of cooperatives through revoking 
funds previously extended by the State.  In Chile, government banks withdrew credit to 
cooperatives, and the Ley General de Cooperativas of 1978 required religious and 
political neutrality of cooperatives, thus illegalizing links to labor parties (Article 1, 
Ministerio de Economia, Chile).  Cooperatives were also faced with an influx of 
competition from international imports as many Latin American economies liberalized 
(Izquierdo Albert 2007: 47). For example, as Colombia implemented neoliberal policy 
reform, the cooperative sector lost 37 percent of its employees and 36 percent of its 
membership (Fajardo Rojas 2003: 129).   
Yet perhaps the most significant challenge to cooperatives of neoliberal policy 
was the increasing reliance on narrow economic criteria for calculating and quantifying 
the success of a business.  A healthy financial balance sheet became the exclusive tool for 
approximating the value of a company.   Thus cooperatives struggled to legitimize their 
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existence through refocusing their efforts disproportionately on enhancing profitability 
(Izquierdo Albert 2007: 48) at the expense of social investment and equitable 
participation from which they derive their meaning.   Dedication to community solidarity 
not only diminished in importance, it was eclipsed by an ethic of individual responsibility 
that has produced an “identity crisis” for cooperatives worldwide (Izquierdo Albert 2007: 
48). 
In conclusion, while economic crisis tends to increase the number of cooperatives, 
the character of that crisis matters in terms of what types of cooperatives will persist, and 
to what extent they are faithful to those precepts that distinguish cooperatives from other 
types of businesses.  In the neoliberal period, cooperatives with previous State support 
closed down, but others opened as a survival strategy for the under-and-unemployed.  
Still other cooperatives were successful at competing in the marketplace, but at the 
expense of the social investments that form the basis of an authentic cooperative sector. 
Welfare Regimes: From National Community to Self-Help Community 
Pensions, health care, and education were all restructured under neoliberal policy.  
The predominant welfare regime in the region had, generally speaking, focused on 
universal coverage, publicly financed and managed.  Effectively this meant policies 
tended towards a redistributive orientation realized through the nexus of the national 
government. Reforms both changed the nature and the content of welfare policies.  
Privatization and decentralization altered the mechanism through which pensions, health 
care and education were provided to the public.  Changes in pension policy were 
paradigmatic of the preference of neoliberal proponents for “increased individual as 
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opposed to collective responsibility” (Niggle 2003: 54).  Obligatory contributions to 
private companies in Chile, Mexico and Bolivia, and a mix of private systems with public 
pay-as-you-go systems in Argentina and Uruguay (Fraile 2009: 221) differed from 
previous systems that relied exclusively on a public schema.  Unfortunately, an average 
of almost 20% of contributions goes to administrative fees to private companies as of 
1997 (Madrid 2002: 161)  
Other development initiatives included privatization and decentralization of social 
services such as health and education. Health care was subcontracted to the private sector 
and decentralized in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Mexico and Brazil so that health systems 
were often managed and funded by municipalities (Fraile 2009: 222). Education was 
similarly decentralized in these countries, and in Chile was partially privatized (Fraile 
2009: 222). Furthermore, social assistance programs changed from a universal orientation 
to one targeting only the extreme poor in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and 
Uruguay.  Chile, Mexico, Bolivia and El Salvador completely privatized their pension 
systems (Madrid 2002: 160).  As could be expected, this led to separate, and unequal, 
systems both in terms of funding and quality (Fraile 2009: 222). 
The material effects on the poor and working classes were significant.  The 
number of workers contributing to pensions fell and has left these pensions exposed to 
the ups and downs of the financial market (Fraile 2009: 226), leaving the most vulnerable 
at a greater disadvantage than under the previous system.  The territoriality of education 
and health care provision, coupled with the increased concentration of the poor and 
working classes in particular neighborhoods, led to unequal systems of provision (Fraile 
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2009: 227) just by geography of residence, either through a lack of services or as a result 
of their poor quality (Maceira & Murillo 2001: 5).  While some of the programs targeted 
at the poor have been successful, high unemployment and job insecurity have meant that 
there are fewer avenues through which these classes are able to supplement or replace 
subsidies with earned wages. 
Concentrating Poverty, Increasing Inequality 
Unemployment increased in the 1990s in Latin America by over 4 points, in part 
due to 1)labor markets made more flexible through deregulation of wages, working 
conditions, and contracts, and 2) more complete integration of Latin American economies 
and financial markets into the global marketplace and its boom and bust cycles (ILO 
2008 qtd. Fraile 2009: 219).  At the same time participation in the informal sector, 
defined by its low wages and lack of access to minimal workplace protections, either 
remained at the same level as prior to reforms or increased (Fraile 2009: 223).  This 
increase is socially significant because “under and unemployment restricts participation 
in social institutions that improve working conditions, such as unions” (Gandelman & 
Ripani 2007: 8) both because informal work is not unionized and because poverty is 
defined by uncertainty.  The precariousness of informal work often focuses people‟s 
resources and time on survival strategies with short time horizons- although the following 
chapter will show how this very uncertainty also laid the foundation for the resurgence of 
alternative economic practices that go beyond mere survival. 
Socioeconomic segregation and rising inequality resulted from the uneven 
impacts of the reforms as outlined above, and from the creation of parallel but inequitable 
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private and public social service provision systems.  In fact, the region would come out of 
reforms with some of the highest inequality in the world (Sader 2008: 6).  In some 
countries, such as Chile, this took the form of a “concentration at the top” (Spagnolo et. 
al 2008: 2), and a much more condensed middle and lower class.  It also created “pockets 
of poverty” (Raczynski & Romaguera 1995: 289).  In the region as a whole income 
concentration was consolidated to such an extent that in Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Argentina, 
and other large economies, the richest decile owned roughly half of the country‟s wealth 
(Moreno-Brid et. al 2004: 354).  Inequality was partially tolerated because neoliberal 
market reforms redefine “citizenship as market participation” (Stahler-Sholk et.al. 2007: 
8).  By deferring government services to the free market, the only way to voice an 
opinion with regards to those services is as a consumer.  Thus purchasing power becomes 
voting power.  For those with little capital, their inability to signal their preferences 
through consumption renders them invisible, non-citizens, except through traditional 
clientelist networks that provide token material benefits in exchange for votes.  This lack 
of voice accelerates inequality as it detaches the poor from decision-making processes.   
Inequality of the new welfare regime mirrors inequity produced in the 
employment regime.  Social segmentation has resulted, and social distancing has grown, 
as classes with access to private health care and education increasingly function within a 
separate social sphere from those who can only afford public services.  With 
neighborhoods also increasingly homogeneous in their socioeconomic characteristics, the 
opportunities for meaningful inter-class contact on a regular basis are sharply reduced.  
This distance is only encouraged by the increase in the relative importance of “resonance 
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boxes” (Gandelman & Ripani 2007: 19), where inequality in one sphere is echoed in 
another. Waning social safety nets and declining employment opportunities mutually 
reinforce the negative impacts of poverty. 
A survey of industrial earnings inequality in the region from import substitution 
through neoliberalism demonstrates the progression of inequality under reforms.  Using 
yearly industrial earnings data published by CEPAL, Galbraith and Garza Cantu have 
compiled a data set that covers 85% of the Latin America‟s population and 91.2% of the 
region‟s total GDP (Galbraith & Garza Cantu 1999: 2).  Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru, 
Uruguay and Venezuela all show increases in inequality when GDP growth did not 
exceed population growth, and when countries are led by military governments enacting 
policies of market liberalization (Galbraith & Garza Cantu 1999: 11).  The authors show 
that when reductions in inequality were the explicit goal of a government that they were 
successful, and that when growth was favored over equity, inequality increased 
(Galbraith & Garza Cantu 1999: 13).   
Economic inequality would also come to be geographically inscribed, and 
therefore would also become spatially rendered social inequality.  Decentralization of 
social services tied health and education to a new territoriality and free market policies 
unbound the political and economic system from concerns of equity.  Poverty was 
concentrated into singular geographic units.  Thus favelas in Rio swelled to become 
“complexes” (Massey et al. 2006: 9), and in Chile the poor were forcibly resettled from 
areas of Santiago that had a “middle or upper class character” (Rodriguez & Icaza 1998: 
1) to southern peripheries.  The effect in both of these areas, decades later, is a profound 
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sense of disempowerment and pessimism about economic opportunities, even where 
housing and services have been improved (Rodriguez & Icaza 1998; Massey et. al 2006).  
Urban disempowerment is generated by a disruption of social ties following relocation, 
social distancing between classes as a result of segregation, and profound cynicism 
regarding employment where those facing unemployment reside in the same geographic 
space.  Methods of analyzing economic performance are typically macro-level, and 
therefore these effects can be glossed over when the evidence is evaluated on a city-wide 
basis rather than at the level of the municipality. 
Yet neoliberalism was never concerned with distribution, but focused its sights 
purely on efficiency, thereby commodifying labor as just another input in production 
(Polyani qtd. Margheritis & Pereira 2007: 27).  However, unlike tin or flowers, this input 
demands dignity, recognition, and some form of equity (Margheritis & Pereira 2007: 28).  
Therefore, policies with the sole intent of liberalizing the economy will neglect the 
distributional inequities that result, and be unprepared to deal with the social unrest, 
alienation, and pessimism that accompany them.  When the proponents of these policies 
acknowledge their deleterious social effects, they are only analyzed in a framework of 
economic growth. Thus we see articles with titles such as “Life is Unfair in Latin 
America but Does it Matter For Growth?” (Blanco 2010), which concerns itself with a 
narrowly circumscribed field of development-as- GDP rather than with measures of well-
being. 
Governments following the neoliberal model and its policy prescriptions were 
unable, or unwilling, to recognize and respond to the changes in norms of fairness, 
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distribution, and solidarity that stemmed from changes in class structure and their 
geographic distribution in urban spaces.  However, it is in this sense that neoliberalism 
was as much a social project as an economic strategy. In the analysis that I develop here, 
I hold that it was neoliberalism‟s transformations of the social regimes and the values that 
support them that would produce the most profound changes in social solidarity in Latin 
America.   
The social solidarity that increasingly defined the political and economic projects 
of the region was replaced with an ethic of separation.  Indeed, Touraine (1977, 5) notes 
that “the mass society has destroyed communities, disrupted social relations and 
confounded roles and norms”.  Furthermore, this separatist tendency only serves to 
replicate itself, as social distance begets further isolation as opportunities for significant 
interaction of different classes of the population are diminished. As a result, prospects for 
the development of alliances and knowledge-building between diverse socioeconomic 
groups are worsening.  Thus mobilization in response to these grievances is greatly 
transformed.  In the next chapter, I will discuss economic heterodoxy as theorized in the 
literature on social economy, apply it to the recent trends embodied in the Solidarity 
Economy, give a brief history of the ideologies that have converged in the Solidarity 
Economy movement, and outline the governmental and non-governmental organizations 





Chapter 2: Socioeconomics and the Solidarity Economy: New Freedoms in an Era of 
the  Downsized State? 
 
Responding to the neoliberal assault on social solidarity, the Solidarity Economy‟s 
primary message is that solidarity between people and communities for social and 
economic ends exists, deserves recognition, and has a priori value as a type of economy.  
Therefore, it is not an imperfect knockoff of a marketplace operating for purely monetary 
purposes.  This chapter will apply the work of social economists, who attempt to validate 
alternatives to the neoclassical model of economic behavior, to describe the historical and 
philosophical importance of solidarity in the private and public sector as they pertain to 
the Solidarity Economy in Latin America.  Through socioeconomic theories, academics 
have catalogued the historical precedents from which the Solidarity Economy derives its‟ 
logic.  A discussion of these theories substantiates the Solidarity Economy movement‟s 
claim that solidarity is not an irrational value alien to economic practices. It once was, 
and can continue to be, central to a type of economy oriented to the community that is 
also capable of producing economic progress, although measured and defined according 
to social, as well as economic, criteria. 
The associative foundations of the social economy have existed everywhere, 
including pre-Columbian Latin America (Defourny & Develetere 1999: 4), but in Europe 
would “defend [the] market economy based on non-capitalist principles of cooperation 
and mutuality,  and critique [. . .] the centralized state” (De Sousa Santos 2006: xxvii).    
Associative movements supported “pluralist and federalist forms of political organization 
assigning civil society a lead role” (De Sousa Santos 2006: xxvii) Associative socialism, 
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founded on the creation of producer cooperatives, was popularized in the late 1800s in 
Europe with associative theories like those of Robert Owen in England (De Sousa Santos 
2006: xxvii), and the work of Charles Fourier, Pierre Proudhon, Laski, Tawney and Cole 
that led to the first worker coops in England and France (xxvii) but which would be 
eclipsed by collectivist Marxism (Defourny & Develtere 1999: 6).  Beyond Marxism, 
associative movements have drawn from diverse ideologies, including social Christianity, 
whose work in protecting the personhood of individuals and the realization of human 
potential through community would lead to the rule of subsidiarity.  This rule states that 
“a  higher authority should not take over any functions that a lower authority- that is, one 
closer to the user-was able to assume”, and led to the first rural savings and credit union 
in Germany (Defourny & Develtere 1999: 6).   
The thinking of the Christian church and latent strains of associative Marxism were 
brought over to Latin America by immigrants and Latin American intellectuals who 
studied in or were exiled by dictatorships to Europe.  Their thinking would mix with the 
communalism of indigenous and Afro-descendant groups whose cultural legacies were 
predicated on similar notions- although radically different political structures- and whose 
treatment by greater society demanded the sustained development of self-help initiatives 
(for example, the run-away slave communities of Brazil known as quilombos) (Singer 
2006: 55).  Peruvian Jose Carlos Mariategui was the first Latin American to wed Socialist 
associative thought with indigenous communal practice in his work The Seven 
Interpretive Essays on Peruvian Reality, written at the beginning of the 19th century 
(Quijano 2006: 419).   Later, the Latin American populism of the 1960s and 70s used the 
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cooperative structure, a hallmark of associative thought, as an “essential ingredient” in its 
projects, and led to an increase in the number of cooperatives from 7,500 to 25,700, and 
from a membership of 2 million to 10 million (Defourny & Develtere 1999: 27). 
Grassroots ecclesiastical communities, often Catholic, who resisted the later dictatorships 
of the region through their social justice work in the economic sphere, also relied on a 
cooperative structure to empower the poor (Defourny & Develtere 1999: 7).   
Defining the Solidarity Economy: The Social, Popular and Informal 
Social solidarity has taken the greatest hit under neoliberal policy because it 
precipitates the “failure on the part of the state to respond to the physical need that is 
unmet by the private sector” (Boyle 2005: 492).  This failure has “profound implications 
for the social values of freedom, equality, and community and thus for the personhood of 
those in need” (Boyle 2005: 492).  The fundamental underpinnings of neoliberal policies 
err in that they assume that the majority of needs should be met by the private sector-
including the human need for dignity through employment; that every individual is 
capable of meeting those needs that do go unmet without any aid on the part of their 
national community, embodied in the State; or that the right of one individual to live with 
their basic needs met is trumped by a system where no one is responsible for anyone else 
and thus that there is no “moral claim on economic resources that derives from 
personhood” (Boyle 2005: 488).  For supporters of neoliberalism, individual economic 
freedom from State interference is the most important liberty, because it will supposedly 
result in a more efficient distribution of resources. This position displaces the need for 
collective responsibility, which may better ensure that social groups are equally free to 
 27 
pursue their economic goals. Collective responsibility was a premise of the previous 
model of the State. However, under neoliberalism, the premise of the State‟s role is to 
secure the individual‟s ability to use private resources and capital according to personal 
criteria.   
The economics of solidarity suggest a more equitable distribution of freedoms than 
that under the neoliberal and the ISI models.  Instead of freedom for individuals to pursue 
personally defined goals in the absence of State intervention, an economics of solidarity 
seeks to create an environment based on freedom of groups to self-manage and self-
actualize according to an ethic of cooperation.  Humans are individuals but they are also 
members of social groups, and their ability to pursue economic goals is conditioned on 
their membership in those groups.  These identities can be gender-based, ethnic, racial, or 
class, but they prefigure individual capacities and opportunities vis-à-vis the greater 
community.  As a result, governmental policies must recognize and work to correct 
inequalities based on group membership.  An economics of solidarity is then premised 
not on control by the State, but on its ability to produce an economic environment that 
equally distributes freedoms to historically marginalized social groups.  Support of an 
associative movement based on democratic ownership and decision-making aids 
structural changes of power, and therefore of freedom, realized through the private sector 
and according to each group‟s self-defined criteria.  Versus the anti-policy of 
neoliberalism, economic solidarism seeks government policies that invest in associations 
such as cooperatives and their attendant social goals, such as cooperative management 
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education, as well as a legal structure that reflects and supports the associations that make 
up this sector of the economy. 
 The production of a crisis of employment and reduced social services under 
neoliberalism demanded a forced associativism that has put renewed emphasis on the 
capacities of local communities to care for their members without intermediation- for 
better or worse- on the part of a national government.  Through decentralization, 
neoliberalism theoretically allows for smaller units of people and their local governments 
to produce changes in government systems of allocation and services on a micro level.  
While populist and State socialist movements of the ISI stripe were concerned with 
equity, they were not concerned with participatory democracy.  Although neoliberal 
policy does not address specifically, and perhaps never bargained for, the potential for 
increased participation in economic decisions, this is possibly the most significant and 
exciting outcome of the application of the Washington Consensus.  Increased 
participation in decentralized social service networks intensifies the inherent tension 
between political democracy and hierarchical economic systems, a tension from which a 
movement dedicated to democratizing the economy has developed. 
 Neoliberal proponents‟ ability to ignore the negative social consequences of 
making labor conditions more flexible also meant that those pushed into the informal 
economy were given space to return to associative economic practices and to revisit the 
type of economy in which the working and low-income classes wanted to participate.  
The collapse of centralized socialist economies freed up the left to think of new 
strategies, rather than remain captured in an authoritarian paradigm (De Sousa Santos 
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2006: xxi).  The failure of the “anonymous” market to meet social and material needs for 
large parts of the population meant that a third way was not only desired but required.  
The informality of much of the population also kept that population out of view of an 
authoritarian and often dictatorial State, and was thus a condition for rediscovering 
associative practices.  These practices reorient the economy, its products, and its 
producers/consumers according to a social logic.  Associative models, where 
organizations created independently of the State, the Church, and other businesses rotate 
around the social ties of their members, have returned to the forefront of this process of 
reconceiving the market.    
 These diverse philosophies stand in stark contrast to the “I and I alone” 
foundation of economic liberalism, and respond with a “me and us” message (Arruda 
2000: 1) that does not artificially distinguish between individual and community 
priorities or needs.  However, this message is embodied in such a diversity of institutions 
and practices in the Solidarity Economy that a few definitions are needed in order to 
delineate its actual and potential borders.  The social economy in developed countries 
includes any organizations or associations providing social services, including 
foundations, NGOs, mutual aid societies, and cooperatives (Defourny & Develtere 1999: 
12-13).  In Latin America the social economy refers to local activities usually between 
families and their surrounding communities (Gaughan & Ferman 1987:  21), and emerges 
from crisis (Fajardo Garcia 2009: 7), which in Latin America was produced by the 
rapidity of urbanization and later the concerted retreat of the State from social services 
(Defourney & Develtere 1999: 23-24).  It has been inscribed in the laws of Latin America 
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since the 1980s, and was referred to beginning in 1984 as the Model for the Sector of the 
Economy of Work (Fajardo Garcia 2009: 20).  Legislation aimed at the social and 
solidarity economy continues to evolve to this day in reflection of the increasing political 
strength of the Solidarity Economy- notably in Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, 
Honduras and Venezuela (Fajardo Garcia 2009: 5-35).   
The popular economy and the informal economy are one and the same and refer to 
those who live in “peripheral urban zones sometimes in precarious conditions” (Nyssens 
1997: 65).  They also focus on the material and social needs of those who belong to these 
sectors, but are not limited to associations. Rather they include all informal activities 
from trade in goods not involving cash, bartering, work for non-reported wages, 
volunteer and domestic work, and social exchange of services (Gaughan & Ferman 1987: 
16).  Some have classified all kin-oriented economic activity in the informal sector as 
associative (see Ric Thompson in Gaughan and Ferman 1987), while others have chosen 
to label it social economy.  Still others (see Razeto “La Economia Popular”) have insisted 
on maintaining the label of popular economy for those economic practices realized on a 
small scale in peripheral urban communities.   
Latin American theorists working in this field distinguish between two types of 
“alternative” economies.  Some theorists contend that where the Solidarity Economy 
revolves around the cooperative, (see Singer in Another Production Is Possible) and 
therefore a “secondary sociality” (Caille 2005: 6) of the broader marketplace, the popular 
economy is characterized by small scale communities (Razeto et. al 1990) and their 
“primary sociality” (Caille 2005: 6); thus these two hybrid sectors are not formed by the 
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same structural mechanisms or oriented to the same goals. In the Solidarity Economy, 
cooperative structures are more formalized and to some extent ideologically based with 
explicit social goals and political connections. In what is typically referred to as the 
“popular economy,” support networks do exist, but are less formalized and more based 
on need.  
However, it is important not to impose strict separation between the two. This is 
because the ideological commitments of the Solidarity Economy are directly informed by 
the survival strategies of the popular economy.  They are not mutually exclusive 
categories.  As Razeto notes, “while the solidarity economy is in general popular, the 
popular economy is not necessarily solidary” (Network Meeting 9/9/10). The primary 
sociality of the popular economy, where family and neighborhood relationships are the 
bedrock of employment creation and providing mutual aid, is a logic that the Solidarity 
Economy values and wants to more widely disseminate.  One first feels solidarity with 
those closest- either through blood or geography.  The rhetoric of the old Left was forged 
in class-based solidarity within particular economic sectors (Cohen 1985: 667), and 
therefore underestimated the importance of solidarities stemming from membership in 
smaller, and multiple, social units such as families, neighborhoods, and ethnic or racial 
groups. The Solidarity Economy‟s cooperative institutions, in contrast, extend the logic 
of the popular economy to the Solidarity Economy, itself more ideologically committed 
and more broadly formed.  An example would be the informal recyclers in many urban 
areas of Latin America that scavenge through garbage to find recyclable materials for 
which they are then paid.  This practice results from a material need for income, not an 
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ideological commitment to recycling per se or to environmentalism.  However, the 
Solidarity Economy‟s cooperative structure and ecological concerns overlap with this 
practice of the informal economy, amplifying a strategy born from need through a 
movement for democratic ownership, decision-making, and commitment to responsible 
consumption (and disposal) of goods.  This expansion is predicated on the existing 
methods of the popular economy- thus the two cannot be completely separated.   
For the purposes of the Solidarity Economy however, the inward-looking tendency 
of associations, mutual-help associations, and informal activities is not sufficient.  Full 
democratization of the economy is the goal, and thus internal management premised on 
democratic principles and distribution of profit as well as a commitment to other 
cooperatives or associations with similar internal structures is also necessary.  The work 
of the Solidarity Economy could extend the rule of primary sociality- realized in family, 
neighborhood and other face-to-face relationships- to spheres of “secondary sociality” 
such as the broader marketplace.  The significance of sociality- of work over capital-
while stemming from the need for employment and a lack of capital, can continue as a 
guiding ethic even once micro-enterprise, cooperatives, non-profits, and community 
associations have capital and no longer operate strictly to provide maximum employment.  
Therefore the Solidarity Economy does not fetishize poverty but takes the socio-ethical 
concerns necessary for survival and carries them forward to circumstances of plenty.  In 
doing so, the Solidarity Economy moves beyond the informal and popular economy as 
so-called “poor people‟s economy” and restructures the social economy democratically.  
One should take care, however, not to produce exclusionary categories for defining the 
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Solidarity Economy as it is still “negotiating reality and utopia” (De Sousa Santos 2006: 
xxii).  Thus it is decidedly not the purpose of this paper to omit those economic 
organizations that do not exactly fit these criteria but to nevertheless be attentive to these 
long-term goals. 
The seven guiding principles of cooperatives, written in 1895, enshrine these values 
and their structural manifestations and deserve mention.  They are voluntary and open 
membership, democratic member control (one person one vote), member economic 
participation, autonomy and independence (from external funders), education, training 
and information (of members and the community), cooperation among cooperatives, and 
concern for community (International Cooperative Alliance).  These principles reorient 
profit towards the community of which the cooperative and its members are a part- 
usually through a fund dedicated to investment in community associations and projects- 
and redistribute profits equitably between members regardless of investment. 
The Solidarity Economy has conceived of this reorientation in terms of homes.  
Marcos Arruda (2000, 2) writes, “the economy, in the humanist culture, demands the care 
and good management of each one of those “homes”. . . .the economy dedicated to social 
well-being . . .the economy in which I desire the well-being of an Other because the other 
also lives in the same home”.  In this phrase the cross-fertilization of Christian humanism 
and indigenous communalism in the Solidarity Economy movement is strikingly evident.  
The axioms of caring for one‟s neighbor as oneself and regarding oneself and one‟s 
environment (social or ecological) as indivisible unites the diverse strains of thought that 
have converged to produce a broad cooperative-based movement in the developing 
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world.  It underscores the historical, geographical persistence of a “spontaneous human 
disposition toward reciprocity and cooperation” (Gaughan & Ferman 21) originally 
necessary for human survival.  This worldview was so universally common that the 
arrival of capitalism and its anonymous market model populated by self-interested 
individuals was taken as a revolution.  Where some may consider this way of conceiving 
the economy as pre-industrial and therefore traditional, the fact that it has persisted in 
Latin America past the age of industrialization, in rural and urban contexts, also suggests 
that it is a fitting post-industrial alternative as well (Gaughan & Ferman 1987: 24).  In 
this sense it is neither reactionary nor conservative but borrows from historical models 
essential in new politico-economic environments such as those produced by neoliberal 
policy. 
As the Solidarity Economy is about ethics and not class, it is inclusive of diverse 
groups of people.  These include informal workers but also lower-middle and middle-
class individuals who feel that values of cooperation and solidarity are important to 
economic exchange. These latter individuals, while not focusing on their workplaces, 
orient themselves to a more responsible ethic of consumption that privileges the purchase 
of goods produced sustainably, by those paid fair wages, and with access to democratic 
participation processes.  The various roles of each part of economic activity in the 
Solidarity Economy- consumption, production, savings, etc.- are illustrated in the 
following graphic, Figure 2.1, from Ethan Miller at the U.S. Solidarity Economy 
Network.  It displays examples of a solidarity venture or practice in each sphere of the 
economy, and how they connect to one another. 
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Figure 2.1 Graphic of Economic Sectors of the Solidarity Economy 
Source: Ethan Miller, U.S. Solidarity Economy Network 
 
The World Social Forum and the Solidarity Economy: Other Worlds are Possible, 
Other Economies are Happening 
The Solidarity Economy is first and foremost creating alternatives through a 
series of locally embedded national civil-society networks developed primarily in 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru, Colombia, Argentina, Cuba, Paraguay, Panama, 
Uruguay and Venezuela.    They are loosely organized at regional and international levels 
and include MEROSUR Solidario, Instituto Politicas para Alternativas para o Cone Sul 
(PACS), Red Latinoamericana de Socioeconomia Solidaria (REDLASSES),  Red 
Intercontinental de Promoción de la Economia Social Solidaria (RIPESS),  and the Red 
Universitaria en Estudios Cooperativos y Asociativismo (UnirCOOP).  The following 
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table, Figure 2.2, is not exhaustive, but highlights some of the central national and 
international networks operating in Latin America. 
Civil Society Networks of the Solidarity Economy in Latin America
Name Member Countries
Espacio Mercosur Solidario Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay
Instituto Politicas para Alternativas para o Cone Sul Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay
Red Latinoamericana de Socioeconomia Solidaria
Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, U.S., Honduras, 
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Holland
Red Intercontinental de Promocion de la Economia Social 
Solidaria (RIPESS)
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru, Colombia
Red Universitaria en Estudios Cooperativos y 
Asociativismo (UNIRCOOP)
Canada, Mexico, Cuba, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela, Chile, Uruguay, Argentina, 
Brazil
Red Latinoamericana de Comercializacion Comunitaria 
(RELACC)
Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Brazil, Uruguay, 
Paraguay, Argentina, Chile
Red de Investigadores Latinoamericanos (RILESS) Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Chile, Colombia
Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra America 
(ALBA)
Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Venezuela
Red Argentina de Comercio Justo Argentina
Movimiento de Economia Solidaria y Comercio Justo Bolivia
Forum Brasileiro de  Economia Solidaria (FBES) Brazil
Red de Economia Solidaria de Santiago Chile
Red de Economia Solidaria Colombia (REDESOL) Colombia
Red Solidaria del Ecuador Ecuador
Consejo Mexicano de Empresas de la Economia Solidaria 
(CMEES)
Mexico
Espacio de Economia Solidaria y Comercio Justo en ParaguayParaguay
Grupo Red de Economia Solidaria de Peru Peru
La Union Nacional de Cooperativas y Organizaciones de la 
Economia Social, Participativa y Solidaria de Venezuela
Venezuela
Coordinadora Nacional de Economia Solidaria (CNES) Uruguay  
Figure 2.2 Civil Society Organizations of the Solidarity Economy in Latin America 
Source: Author‟s Elaboration 
 
These organizations emerged from and coalesced around the World Social Forum, 
begun in 2001.  While it may seem a peripheral digression, the history of the formation of 
the World Social Forum (WSF) is relevant to a proper discussion of the Solidarity 
Economy in a context of neoliberal governance. It is representative of the widespread 
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associative orientation of leftist social movements to a less unified State (Touraine 1981: 
8).  The WSF began in Brazil as a reaction to the closed-doors, top-down meetings of the 
Global North‟s policy-making elite at the World Economic Forum.  As there was no 
similar space for those in the Global South affected by the policies of the World 
Economic Forum to come together and discuss their ideas for development, the WSF was 
organized for that purpose. 
Progressive organizations from Brazil decided that the event should be held in Porto 
Alegre (Teivainen 2010: 623), a city in Brazil with particularly strong historical support 
for the Worker‟s Party, whose political base emerged from the strong associative 
connections between “trade unions, Catholic organisations, women‟s movements and 
many other parts of the vibrant Brazilian civil society” (Teivainen 2010: 674).  This 
plurality of groups would go on to organize this annual event beginning in 2001, held in 
Porto Alegre for many years and once in Mumbai, India.  Groups from Latin America 
went on to develop regional Social Forums- known as the Foro Social de las Americas-
beginning in 2004 in Quito, Ecuador, and have been held every two years since in 
Venezuela, Guatemala, and Paraguay (Foro Social Americas “Que es el Foro Social de 
las Americas?”). 
 These civil society organizations went on to lobby their national governments for 
recognition and policy changes.  In the last decade a number of national governments 
have responded with the development of governmental organs to foment, technically 
advise, and support the Solidarity Economy initiatives inside their borders.  In 1998-
notably before the World Social Forum- President Pastrana in Colombia transformed the 
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National Department of Cooperatives into the Superintendencia de la Economia Solidaria 
under the auspices of the Ministry of Housing and Public Credit (Superintendencia de la 
Economia Solidaria de Colombia, “Nuestra Entidad”).  In Brazil, President Lula began 
the Subsecretaria de Economia Solidaria (SENAES) in 2003, housed in the Ministry of 
Work and Employment.    President Correa in Ecuador started the Instituto Nacional de 
Economia Solidaria in 2010 under the Ministry of Economic and Social Inclusion (MIES, 
“Institutos”).  President Chavez in Venezuela also developed a Ministerio de Economia 
Popular in 2004 as part of his so-named Bolivarian revolution (MINEP). The missions of 
other government institutions, such as the Departamento de Cooperativas in Chile or the 
Ministerio de la Produccion in Peru, deal with aspects of the Solidarity Economy without 
explicitly functioning as an institution of support.  Therefore, while certain countries lack 
ministries of the Solidarity Economy, their absence should not be taken to mean that 
there is no interaction between the government and the Solidarity Economy movement. 
The associative orientation of the World Social Forum and the Solidarity Economy 
are best categorized by Jean Cohen (1985) in her article “Strategy or Identity”.  In it, she 
describes what is truly innovative about certain contemporary social movements, 
highlighting the defining characteristics of the WSF that allowed the Solidarity Economy 
to materialize, and thus demonstrates a broader trend from which the Solidarity Economy 
derives some of its unique traits. The WSF‟s purpose is to organize a pluralist space of 
global civil society (Patomäki & Teivainen 2004: 151) that shows the possibilities of “a 
practical school of democracy” (Teivainen 2010: 629).  These goals mirror Cohen‟s 
description (1985, 669) of new social movements as struggling “in the name of 
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autonomy, plurality, and difference”.  The WSF and the Solidarity Economy also exhibit 
“self-limiting radicalism” (Cohen 66) in their respective rallying cries of “another world 
is possible” (Patomäki & Teivainen 2004: 145) and “another economy is possible.”  In 
calling for “another globalization” and “another economy” they assert an alternative 
stance on issues of global trade relations and the democratization of the economy without 
becoming a space for negative positioning of anti-capitalism and anti-globalization, and 
without making revolutionary demands on how to change these global systems.  By 
choosing to use the term “another”, they emphasize the self-limiting aspect of plurality 
that the opening of a space for global civil society is intended to bring into being. 
While the WSF and the Solidarity Economy do “interpret [their] actions as attempts 
to renew a democratic political culture and to reintroduce the normative dimension of 
social action into political life” (Cohen 1985: 670), they do not do this through producing 
political positions on issues.  Furthermore, the WSF does not even allow political parties 
to participate in the Forum.  Thus the WSF authentically seeks to give space for this new 
democratic political culture to flourish, through an open exchange of ideas, but protects 
the social movements and actors producing these ideas from influence and cooptation by 
those already accepted into the political sphere.  This conscious separation of political 
and civil society also speaks to a shift in focus from seeking power to enter the State 
government to lobbying the State from the outside. 
The primary frame of the WSF is that the most outstanding grievance against 
marginalized populations is a lack of autonomous space for global civil society to work in 
concert with its members and to take itself as its own object of action, rather than 
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exclusively focusing on the State.  Teivainen notes (2010, 622), “instead of asking that a 
particular Third World state be given more decision-making power in global affairs, 
today‟s activists may ask for more power for the civil society groups that confront both 
governmental and corporate power”. The Solidarity Economy takes up this thread in 
calling for autonomous space for economic actors to participate in decision-making in the 
economy, rather than effecting change in the economy through political channels.  
However, they borrow the political ideal of democratic equality in advancing decision-
making power based on notions of personhood, rather than investment.   
Adopting notions of democratic equality from the political sphere to the private 
sphere is a “specific response[s] to the advance of neoliberal globalization within the 
process of nominal democratization” (Stahler-Sholk 2007: 5).   The World Economic 
Forum that the WSF responded to was a private, elite event that made decisions, often in 
concert with local dictatorships, about the economic lives of billions of people without 
ever consulting them.  The repercussions that flowed from these decisions also decisively 
marked the economy with their autocratic origins.  Furthermore, even the now established 
contemporary democracies of Latin America are limited in their ability to produce 
equality when they are embedded in a context of globalized capital and the undemocratic 
international institutions that (de)regulate it.  Perhaps unknowingly, the WSF and the 
Solidarity Economy also indicted modernization projects of the left and centralized, 
planned economies in their call for autonomy.  Through interaction between civil society 
groups at the WSF, participants found that political and socioeconomic grievances 
stemmed from the same root.  Indeed, the political and socioeconomic are so intertwined 
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that the WSF saw the need for a genuinely global, pluralistic political space as a 
precondition for the resolution of socioeconomic grievances.  A “crisis of representation” 
- political and economic- is at the heart of the projects of both the WSF and the Solidarity 
Economy. 
The Solidarity Economy emerges from the WSF as one particular route that many 
participants saw that they could take to enact changes in the economic sphere.   It 
opposes the foci of traditional neoliberal development, with its “marked emphasis on 
macroeconomic results” and corresponding lack of attention to “democratic decision-
making processes, the equitable distribution of the fruits of development, and the 
protection of the environment” (De Sousa Santos 2006: xxiii).  It democratizes market-
based citizenship, in part through public campaigns that seek to change the values of the 
general public with regard to consumption, and works to support and develop 
democratically owned and managed businesses.  As Touraine (1977, 22) writes, “self-
management [. . .] is important because it stipulates that social movements are capable of 
directing their own action [. . .] instead of being  merely a transmission or relay station in 
the service of political forces.”  It is, like the WSF, a practical school of democracy and is 
a demand for “collective citizenship rights, not just the individualism and formal equality 
promised by the marketplace that in practice leaves so many destitute and disempowered” 
(Stahler-Sholk 2007: 8). 
Neoliberal Victories: Private Solidarity Over Public Solidarity 
The lien solidaire that the Solidarity Economy wants to reawaken has emerged, and 
reemerged, when formal mechanisms of equality fail (Moulaert & Ailenei 2005: 2041).  
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Thus it responds to periodic crises of a capitalist marketplace, and in particular the 
conceptual and material tension that arises from increasing inequality in a context of 
democracy (Moulaert & Ailenei 2005: 2041).  As Luis Razeto, a Chilean academic 
working with the Solidarity Economy in that country writes, it “is a real response to the 
large and growing social injustices and inequalities that the economic system generates, 
that translates into processes of disintegration of social coexistence”(Que es La Economia 
Solidaria?)  Perhaps contradictorily, the neoliberal reforms that have most recently 
prompted the Solidarity Economy movement both attack solidarity through public 
mechanisms while demanding it of those who suffer under restructuring and must employ 
social solidarity to survive. 
The praxis of solidarity came to be understood as the science of social justice, not 
social utility (Moulaert & Ailenei 2005: 2040), or as Razeto suggests, putting the 
economy into solidarity and solidarity into the economy (La Economia Solidaria: 
Concepto, Realidad y Proyecto).  It broadens the definition of the economy to include 
private redistribution and reciprocity as well as the market (Moulaert & Ailenei 2005: 
2044) and from this definition contextualizes the economy according to locally-defined 
hierarchies of needs (Moulaert & Nussbaumer 2005: 2072).  Thus it privileges the social 
actor before the product, the community before the good, and needs before wants.  Its 
grounding in the social also lends a local, and therefore distinctive, quality to its goods, a 
characteristic which stands in sharp relief to the practices of multinational corporations 
that increasingly remake economies into generic and anonymous bodies of like products 
and standardized workers. 
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The Solidarity Economy in Latin America: Diverse Practices, Convergent Solutions 
The successes of the Solidarity Economy so far in Latin America are varied, and are 
predicated on the ability of the social movements that met at the WSF to organize 
themselves and to pressure the government for recognition in the form of supportive 
regulation, subsidies, and technical advice.  The existing legal framework for 
cooperatives in particular leaves much to be desired. For example, the issue of 
subcontracting non-members highlights the type of legal recognition and regulation that 
the Solidarity Economy attempts to negotiate with the State. Sub-contracting non-
members, particularly when it occurs in unlimited numbers, is mutually detrimental to 
both members and non-members.  Non-members do not enjoy the same avenues for 
participation or systems of remuneration as members.   Cooperatives can also be 
functionally dominated by non-members with no commitment to reproducing equal 
relationships of power or distribution of resources.   In Argentina this practice is only 
allowed under specific circumstances, and for which the law requires a separate fiscal 
account (Camilletti et al. 2005: 38).  In Chile sub-contracting is unlimited, and payment 
for sub-contracted workers is pro-rated by participation, while in Uruguay this situation is 
not legally defined (Camilletti et al. 2005: 39).   
In Brazil, the currently ruling Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) has long been engaged 
in the work of cooperative building. The Brazilian Forum on the Solidarity Economy 
(FBES) and SENAES, the secretariat created by PT member President Lula, have assisted 
hundreds of thousands of participants. They have performed two censuses of the 
Solidarity Economy to date (neither of which have been published), and even developed 
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their own system of certification known as “Made Without Bosses”.  It is both a rural and 
urban movement, with rural participants such as the Movement for Landless Workers 
often focusing on issues of land reform, and urban participants organized around 
producer cooperatives in industrial and social service sectors.  The Secretariat has 
actively promoted the Solidarity Economy through organizing meetings between civil 
society organizations, universities and other public organs of support and promotion, and 
State representatives (SENAES 2003: 98) including meetings with the quilombo ex-
runaway slave communities.  Additionally the assistance of technology incubators 
created by state universities has served to guide cooperative formation through a 
curriculum that teaches management, participation, and finance (SENAES 2004: 68).   
The history of the development of SENAES in Brazil is well-known, but those of 
other ministries have yet to be recorded in the academic literature or disseminated to a 
greater public.  It would appear that leftist governments are those most inclined to take a 
concerted and sustained interest in the Solidarity Economy.  However, a leftist 
government is not a sufficient condition for the development of a governmental organ 
exclusively dedicated to support and promote the Solidarity Economy.  In Chile, where a 
left of center government held the presidency from 1991 to 2006, no ministry or sub-
ministry has been created and, indeed, there are few agencies that have funded Solidarity 
Economy initiatives.  In Argentina, there are numerous existing agencies that engage with 
the Solidarity Economy, such as the Instituto Nacional de Asociativismo y Economia 
Social, whose mission is to legislate, control and promote the social economy through 
cooperatives and mutual aid societies (INAES).  The strong existing tradition of producer 
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cooperatives, their civil society organizations and their continued political power may 
explain the existence of this institute.    
In Venezuela, government contribution is more hands-on and comes accompanied 
with the populist rhetoric and what some see as heavy-handed intervention of Chavez‟s 
regime.  As an associative movement is premised on freedom of association, the civic 
repression that has accompanied Chavez‟s presidency calls into question the 
independence of the Solidarity Economy from State control.  Regardless, a widespread 
cooperative movement has been documented in that country.  In Argentina, the Solidarity 
Economy is much less formally consolidated yet hews closer to the ethic of the 
movement than others nominally more organized. The last two decades of recuperating 
factories set to go bankrupt and remaking them as successful cooperatives illustrates both 
the extreme levels of unemployment that Argentina experienced- 40% as of 2002- as well 
as the remarkable capacity of Argentinians for democratizing the economy as a response 
(Di Marco & Moro 2004: 118).  One hundred and thirty businesses have been 
recuperated as of 2003, with a full 75 percent organized as producer cooperatives (Di 
Marco & Moro 2004: 123) with the support of the long-standing private sector Institute 
for Mobilizing Cooperative Funds (IMFC) (Di Marco & Moro 2004: 126).  In addition, in 
Argentina the practice of subcontracting non-members for wage work is harshly 
discouraged (Camilletti et al. 2005: 38) and thus cooperatives tend to function closer to 
the seven guiding principles than in other countries where this is not the case.   
In Ecuador, President Correa has had a continued interest in giving voice within the 
national government to indigenous peoples, evidenced by the constitutional changes he 
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enacted in 2008 to give rights to nature and declaring Ecuador a plurinational state.  His 
orientation to the demands of indigenous groups for a policy framework that privileges 
“me and us” relationships between individuals in communities and communities with 
nature is in concert with the momentum of the Solidarity Economy (Tygel 2008: 1) The 
Solidarity Economy and the Sub-secretary of the Solidarity Economy have a decidedly 
rural, indigenous focus.  Given the ethnic make-up of that country, this is a policy 
proportional to the concerns of a majority of citizens, and yet sets a historical precedent 
nonetheless.  In staunch opposition to modernizing precepts, the president of the 
Solidarity Economy organization in Ecuador (FENOCIN) has said that the new financial 
support for associative practices in rural areas substantiates FENOCIN‟s belief that “it is 
still much more than possible for rural communities to live in rural areas, when one 
thinks of fomenting policies that support the indigenous and the campesino” (REL-UITA 
1).  Thus economic development is decentered from the city and manufacturing, and 
redirects resources and planning back into rural areas where many live and from which 
traditional indigenous ways of life derive their spiritual meaning.   
In Bolivia the role of indigenous groups is also central to the development of the 
Solidarity Economy.  Through the government of President Evo Morales, a new Ministry 
of Productive Development and Plural Economy was opened in June of 2010 (REAS).  
The recognition of a plurality of economies, and of a plurinational state within Bolivia, is 
directly connected to the struggles by indigenous peoples for recognition of the diverse 
political and economic bodies that have operated and continue to exist in that country.  
The Movement for a Solidarity Economy and Fair Trade of Bolivia- the non-
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governmental organization representing the Solidarity Economy- was one of many 
groups instrumental in establishing that ministry and in directing its goals towards 
alternative economic development initiatives (REAS).  
In Mexico, the Solidarity Economy is both rural and urban.  FONAES (National 
Fund for Social Businesses) extended financial support to 5,620 businesses employing 
mostly marginal community members in rural and urban areas in 2008, doubling the 
previous year‟s numbers (FONAES 3), although its focus is not on cooperatives per se 
but micro-businesses of the popular economy.  In rural areas the Mexican Network of 
Ecotourism (RME) has focused on what Barkin and Pailles have called “ecological 
economics”, or what is more typically called sustainable development.  There has been a 
decided focus on community-based eco and social tourism, particularly in Oaxaca 
(Barkin & Pailles 1999: 1), as economic growth through tourism is of unmistakable 
importance for the national government in rural, often indigenous areas (CESTUR 5). 
However, only fifteen of the more than 400 ecotourist businesses registered with 
FONAES are community-based (CESTUR 6).  As such the Mexican Solidarity 
Economy‟s focus on ecological matters- preservation as well as promotion of the 
environment through tourism- represents a unique challenge to consolidating material, 
social, and cultural concerns of local people in contact with international companies on 
the one hand, and international visitors on the other.  Traditional methods of agriculture-
such as allowing certain lands to lay fallow for years in order for the soil to regenerate-
are undermined by the development of businesses that obtain what appears to be unused 
land for tourist use.   Thus the Solidarity Economy in Mexico is seeking to develop 
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tourism that respects the local uses of ecological systems. Through ecological protection, 
more equitable distribution of profits derived from that tourism, and increased 
participation of local constituents in deciding how economic development through 
tourism comes about (Barkin 2000: 1), the Mexican Solidarity Economy is applying local 
priorities, concepts of well-being, and development to a sector fundamental to the 
Mexican economy. 
In Peru the Aymara concept of three communities- the divine, humans, and nature- is 
the foundation for the rural approximation of the Solidarity Economy (Munoz & Solano 
2009: 132).  Respect for these three communities in the mode of production- communal 
agriculture- is seen as imperative for the reproduction of a “good life”.  The fruits of 
individual labor are private to the extent that they do not impede on another‟s ability to 
meet their material needs, which are, as defined above, also ecological and spiritual 
(Munoz & Solano 2009: 133).  The Grupo Red de Economia Solidaria de Peru (GRESP) 
links rural production of agricultural and artisanal products with urban markets, teaching 
consumers about the particular values of the community from which the good originates. 
(GRESP “Quienes Somos”).  
In Chile the Solidarity Economy is supported principally by Christian and Catholic 
organizations, which reflects the historical support of the Solidarity Economy by the 
church as an alternative to State socialism (Moulaert & Ailenei 2005: 2042) as well as the 
mobilization of religious institutions against the authoritarianism of the Pinochet years. 
Where the Solidarity Economy in other countries has broad political support from 
progressive parties, in Chile traditional institutions like the Catholic and Christian 
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churches have most actively involved themselves in this alternative paradigm.  The 
Church in an urban context- particularly in Santiago- is responsible to urban, mestizo 
constituents, whereas the Christian NGOs operating in the South are largely working with 
Mapuche women on traditional artisanal work through cooperatives. 
As is evident from this brief review, ethnic, religious, cultural, gender and class 
identities do not preclude collective action under the banner of the Solidarity Economy. 
Furthermore, the Solidarity Economy, in its call for economic plurality, recognizes that 
individuals belong to multiple categories at once, freeing up individuals and institutions- 
across and within groups-  to partake in collective socioeconomic projects according to 
diverse situations, criteria and ideology.  This allows the Catholic Church and Christian 
organizations, as well as indigenous groups, to construct radical economic initiatives 
from which Marxists of the old Left once excluded them, and in so doing, broadens the 
potential base of supporters. 
The list provided of governmental and non-governmental organizations is not 
comprehensive but does provide a sample of the geographical, cultural, and institutional 
diversity at work beneath the Solidarity Economy name.  However, there are few reliable 
numbers quantifying the presence of the Solidarity Economy. This is due to a variety of 
factors including the lack of legal recognition of their structures (such as the case of 
subcontracting wage workers), the relative newness of the movement, and the very 
diversity of initiatives under the Solidarity Economy umbrella.  It should still be evident 
that some countries have experienced greater success than others in strengthening the 
Solidarity Economy through cooperative-building, public-private partnerships, 
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institutional recognition, legal support, and consumer education.  The following chapter 
further describes the implementation and effects of neoliberal policy under dictatorial 
regime in Chile, the history of associativism and cooperatives in that country, and an 
introduction to the organization of the Solidarity Economy Network in Santiago. This 
background chapter further grounds my case study of the Network and thus gives context 


















Chapter 3: Neoliberalism, Inequality and the Solidarity Economy in Chile 
To better explain the emergence of the Solidarity Economy in Chile, it is 
necessary to further describe the implementation and effects of neoliberalism in that 
country.  Social regime change began earlier in Chile than in other Latin American 
countries.  The successful democratic election of socialist Salvador Allende in 1970 
precipitated a violent right-wing military coup by Augusto Pinochet in 1973. As in other 
Latin American nations, this dictatorship was repressive, disappearing and torturing 
thousands perceived as threats to the establishment of a right-wing authoritarian 
government.  A brief discussion of the reforms under Allende is needed to understand 
Pinochet‟s agenda as well as the particular political and social transformations that 
precluded something like a solidarity economy from taking root under Allende‟s 
presidency. 
Salvador Allende, the first democratically elected Marxist president in the world 
(Munoz 2008: 1), nationalized key industries such as “mining conglomerates, large 
companies, banks, and latifundia (large agricultural estates)” (Munoz 2008: 5), rationed 
food (which the US also did at the time) (Codevilla 1993: 137), and invested in what 
would be considered the most advanced universally-oriented social welfare systems in 
the Western Hemisphere (Mesa Lago 1978 qtd. Schild 2000: 278).  Through these 
policies he attempted to create a “social property” sector that would coexist with a mixed 
and a private sector of the economy (Munoz 2008: 5).  In so doing, he greatly polarized 
the country, from which he had received only 34% of the vote. Relationships between 
certain sectors of the economy grew more antagonistic, as his policies pitted “capitalists, 
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landowners, the middle class and their political allies against labor, peasants, and leftist 
parties” (Silva 1993: 535). 
.  The State‟s role was to redistribute and/or seize wealth and land from individual 
private owners for transfer to State-run ministries, and in some cases to cooperatives of 
the working class. While this politically emboldened unions and cooperatives to a certain 
degree, it also failed to include the diversity of the popular classes and their existing 
social organization, falsely identifying them with the socioeconomic and political 
priorities of industrial workers (Nyssens 1997: 67).  The work of Catholic groups in 
concert with the Christian Democratic party in the early 1960s was premised on locally 
oriented, neighborhood participatory development projects (Schild 2000: 291) and 
cooperatives, whose numbers increased by  70% in the last half of the decade (Contreras 
et al. 2005: 71).  However, Allende‟s policies artificially forced the existing mutualist 
tradition of the informal economy into a model premised on State control. Furthermore, 
the priorities of the industrial working class, and means of reaching those goals, differed 
from those who belonged to the popular and/or social economy in urban areas.  
Pinochet and the Implementation of Neoliberalism 
In 1973, Pinochet instituted what has been characterized as “perhaps the most 
thoroughly militarized regime in the history of South American authoritarian 
governments” (Arriagada Herrera 171), a government composed of “a united, obedient, 
hierarchical and non-deliberative military” (Arriagada Herrera 1988: 170).  For example, 
almost half of the 118 cabinet ministers from 1973-1985 were members of the Armed 
Forces (Arriagada Herrera 1988: 171).  Forty two of the fifty governors of the fifty 
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Chilean provinces were active duty military officers in 1986, and 64% of university 
rectors from the time of the coup to 1986 were retired military officers and 23% were 
active duty officers (Arriagada Herrera 171).  Relationships with foreign countries were 
almost militarized, as 33% of heads of diplomatic missions were military officers in 
1986.  The military also extended its political hand into the economy, with fifteen of the 
eighteen presidents of economic development agencies under CORFO (the state 
development agency) being military officers (Arriagada Herrera 1988: 172). 
To the extent that the informal economy‟s institutions of participation were 
associated with Allende‟s projects, under Pinochet‟s military rule they also became a 
target of attack (Nyssens 1997: 68).  Political parties, cooperatives, neighborhood 
associations and other organizations in popular neighborhoods and  identified with a left-
wing political consciousness were all actively repressed as they were at odds with the 
economic policies that Pinochet was to put in place.  His reforms were the beginning of 
“a prolonged association between military dictatorships and authoritarianism” (Quijano 
2006: 429). From September through December of 1973 an average of 119 people were 
killed every week (Munoz 2008: 21).  His economic policy, known as “the brick” 
(Codevilla 1993: 134) began a process of “withering away of the state” (Codevilla 1993: 
139) that sharply lessened trade and capital barriers, privatized state-owned enterprises 
(except copper), and deregulated labor.  Unionization levels declined rapidly, from 33 
percent in 1960 to 19 percent at the end of the 1980s (Marshall 2005: 25), and unions, 
collective-bargaining and strikes were made illegal from 1973-1979 (Raczynski & 
Romaguera 1995: 278).  Cooperatives, into which large numbers of the rural and urban 
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poor were organized, were dissolved and government credit previously extended to them 
was summarily revoked, lowering their numbers by a fifth from 1973-1982 in rural areas 
(Departamento de Cooperativas).  1,258 cooperatives were dissolved from 1975-1989 
(Contreras et al. 2005: 72). The informal economy came to comprise 20% of the Chilean 
population by 1980 (Nyssens 1997: 68).  In many cases permanent full time employees, 
now lacking the privileges of a formal contract, were let go and then subcontracted 
without benefits or regulation, a process referred to now as the “Chileanization” of labor 
(Schild 2000: 283). 
The welfare state was quantitatively altered- decentralized and privatized- as well 
as qualitatively changed through Pinochet‟s Plan de Modernizaciones (Schild 2000: 282).  
Redistribution and universal coverage, a hallmark of the pre-dictator years, was replaced 
by targeted efforts that reflected the belief that equity should flow from market 
mechanisms and not from concerted planning on the part of the State (Schild 2000: 282).  
An example of targeting is unemployment benefits directed only at the elderly and 
disabled, where before this benefit was extended regardless of age or disability.  Social 
services in the form of health care, education and pensions, was assumed by the private 
sphere and managed by municipalities instead of a central national government. Citizens 
became consumers purportedly free to choose social services according to their own 
individual preferences- thus marking the beginning of “market citizens” whose rights are 
in part conditioned on their ability to pay (Schild 2000: 276).  The change in welfare 
regime, coupled with precarious employment, undoubtedly contributed to the increase in 
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the informal economy as a survival strategy as well as a return to reciprocal practices of 
the past (Nyssens 1997: 68). 
Pinochet believed that “regulation was inherently partisan” (Codevilla 1993: 13), 
and thus deregulated the economy.  In accordance with this ostensibly neutral position, he 
also enacted a new constitution that “made it as difficult as possible for laws to benefit or 
disadvantage specific sectors, activities or geographic zones” (Codevilla 1993: 133), so 
that regional or sectoral redistribution along with income redistribution was purportedly 
halted.  However, non-regulation is also a partisan position.  Pinochet‟s evolving 
relationship with different economic coalitions of the elite, who benefited by varying 
degrees of economic liberalism, directed the extent to which neoliberalism was instituted 
and unravels the position that deregulation was an impartial policy.   
Eduardo Silva is an author who has traced each phase of neoliberal 
implementation under Pinochet- from gradual (1973-1975) to radical (1975-1982) to 
pragmatic (1983-1988)- with the economic interests of different economic sectors and 
their appointments in Pinochet‟s government.  Thus the gradual phase of implementation 
was spearheaded by businessmen in favored economic sectors such as industry, mining, 
the large scale commercial sector and landowners who were rebuffed under Allende.   
They preferred gradual reforms because their production was domestically-oriented but 
internationally competitive; thus a more measured reform tactic eased these industries 
into international competition (Silva 1993: 356-7).  The radical phase was initiated by 
those business interests who had liquid assets in finance and therefore who were already 
internationally competitive, and had access to what were at that time scarce financial 
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resources (Silva 1993: 544).  These businessmen were then appointed to ministries to 
work closely with economists trained under the aforementioned Milton Friedman (Silva 
1993: 547).  The pragmatic phase was in part a reaction to the global recession and debt 
crisis of the early 1980s, under which banks, mutual funds and many businesses failed, 
many of the middle class lost their entire savings, GDP dropped 14 percent, and a quarter 
of the labor force faced unemployment (Codevilla 1993: 138).  Real wages would not 
recover until 1986 (Codevilla 1993: 138).  The angered middle class, in concert with the 
Christian Democratic party and economic groups owning fixed, internationally 
competitive assets, demanded a revision of policy that would reinstate certain sectoral 
and industrial advantages to key constituents (Silva 1993: 553-555).  Intermittent 
deregulation only favored certain groups over others rather than purportedly extracting 
the State from the economy.   
 These shifting preferences further perpetuated income concentration in the top 
decile of the population, which receives 42.3% of total national income (Spagnolo et. al 
2008: 2).  Without the most minimal redistribution of the growing wealth of the country, 
and lacking politico-economic institutions of the working class and those in the informal 
economy to collectively challenge this new state of affairs, norms of fairness began a 
rapid transformation.  The spread of norms of equality through the rise of unions, 
collectives, and progressive political leadership was halted, and replaced by political 
institutions apparently much more tolerant of economic and social inequality.   
 In the mid-1970s Pinochet instituted a “revitalization” and resettlement of the 
capital that directly and indirectly affected 65,000 families.  From the informal housing 
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areas known as campamentos and the older central housing units, or cités, Pinochet 
summarily removed 35,000 families and relocated them to the southern periphery of the 
city (Rodriguez & Icaza 1998: 1).  This resettlement was carried out not only to improve 
housing conditions but according to “other criteria [that] included the image of the 
municipality, especially in the case of the central municipality and municipalities where 
upper-and-middle-income sectors resided” (Rodriguez & Icaza 1998: 1). For the 
resettled, this resulted in “a significant loss in terms of social networks and family 
relationships” (Rodriguez & Icaza 1998: 1), and created profound pessimism regarding 
the ability of those moved to find employment.  Municipalities were created and 
restructured to produce socioeconomic homogeneity, ostensibly for the purpose of 
increasing the capabilities of the government to efficiently target social services.  These 
twin trends- resettlement and rezoning- led to deep segregation of the metropolis, both in 
residential and commercial character.  As a result, “pockets of poverty” (Raczynski & 
Romaguera 1995: 289) were created alongside “concentration [of great wealth] at the 
top” (Spagnolo et. al 2008:  2), and therefore urban inequality became geographically and 
materially more conspicuous.  The earnings increase of the poor from 1970-73 under 
Allende was undone by the elimination of a minimum wage in 1973 and earnings 
inequality continued to increase until 1982, when it rapidly worsened until the return of 
civil government (Galbraith & Garza Cantu 1999: 5).   
Mapping Inequality in Santiago 
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Neoliberalism‟s capacity for reorganizing “resources of actual (and potential) political 
opposition” (Peck & Tickell 2002: 399) was spatially rendered in the appropriately 
named urban periphery.  This reorganization, and its inadequate if not  
 
Figure 3.1 Comunas of Greater Santiago 
Source: Santiago de Chile: Metropolization, Globalization and Inequity 
 
explicit lack of focus on equity has not precluded the proclamation of a “Chilean 
miracle”, as the results of Pinochet‟s reforms have been dubbed.  In part the institution of 
new poverty measures, named the Ficha CAS,  have obscured the actual poverty that 
exists in the country.  The Ficha CAS categorizes the poor, non-poor, and indigent 
according to education and income but also through itemizing ownership of household 
goods like appliances and furniture (Schild 2000: 286).  Thus indicators of decreasing 
poverty paint a more optimistic picture of the poor‟s living standards than the reality 
behind the indicators would suggest.  For example, one of the four components of 
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poverty as defined by the Chilean government is ownership of durable goods.  Where 
poverty declined from 21 percent in 1970 to 13 percent in 1987, 4/5ths of that decline are 
accounted for from 1970-1982 primarily by ownership of televisions (Raczynski & 
Romaguera 1995:288).  Of the three other indicators of poverty- housing, crowding, and 
ability to dispose of human excrement- ownership of durable goods says the least about 
improved quality of life.  While it may indicate access to credit (and therefore debt), it 
remains to be seen how ownership of a television reflects basic living standards such as 
sanitation.   
 The unequal distribution of improved standards of living and the nature of 
socioeconomic spatial segregation in the capital are revealed through a disaggregation of 
macro indicators.  Test scores for middle school and high school children in mathematics 
and Spanish, average size of houses, and total approved office space all serve as 
indicators of this phenomenon.  Below three maps, Figures 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 are 
reproduced showing these indicators.  Through them we see that the best test scores, most 
office space, and largest homes are all clustered in a small number of comunas.   
 The best test scores come from Vitacura, Las Condes, and Providencia.  The 
largest homes were built in Vitacura and Lo Barnechea, and 96 percent of total new 
office space built from 1990-1998 was constructed in Huenchuraba, Santiago, 
Providencia, Vitacura and Las Condes.  All of these comunas lay adjacent to one another, 
constructing a block of wealth whose advantages are evidenced by the successful 
educational performance of the children who live in it.  Santiago, which contains many of 
the central government‟s buildings, could be taken as an anomaly in terms of office 
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Figure 3.2 Test scores by comuna, 1997 
Source: Santiago de Chile: Metropolization, Globalization and Inequity 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Average size of approved houses, 1990-1998 





Figure 3.3 Comunas that contain 96 percent of total office space built between 1990 and 1998 
Source: Santiago de Chile: Metropolization, Globalization and Inequity 
 
construction.  Regardless, not only are the largest homes built in this small number of 
comunas, but white- collar office work is also concentrated in the same area.  Not 
coincidentally, the financial services sector is also located in these comunas, of which 
more than a third of the city‟s GDP is comprised (CASEN 2006: 18).   
 Conversely, poverty levels are also much higher in the other comunas, mostly 
located in the southern half of the city.  As of 2006, La Pintana had a poverty rate of 17.2 
percent, whereas Las Condes‟s poverty rate was 2.3 (CASEN 2006)- a full 14 times less!  
In fact in only five comunas 20-30 percent of the population lives below the poverty line 
(Dockendorff et al. 2000: 174).  Living below the poverty line means, among other 
things, no regular access to disposal of human waste, a condition that 31,750 families 
find themselves in, with the most vulnerable comunas, Maipú and Peñalolen, located in 
the south of the city. 
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 Even while the extremely poor experience almost four times the rate of 
unemployment than the non-poor (CASEN 2006), many of those who do find work are 
not able to earn enough to support themselves.  Almost a tenth of Santiago‟s GDP is 
produced by small businesses (CASEN 2006), yet three quarters of the poor are 
employed by these same businesses (Dockendorff et al. 2000: 174-5).  While some would 
say that the existence of these jobs proves neoliberalism a success because they alleviate 
poverty through markets, I would argue that this reflects the systemic failure of the 
market to provide survival-level pay as a significant portion of the capital‟s GDP is 
produced by those working for poverty wages.  These socioeconomic groups contribute 
taxes to the same municipalities whose health and educational services are determined by 
the income of their constituents.  Even with vouchers for private schools and a semi-
public health system parallel to the private one, this has meant that alternative 
opportunities for improvement in health and education are blocked.  By tying health and 
education to income, the effects of poverty are multiplied; by concentrating people by 
socioeconomic group, the effects of poverty are geographically contained.   
 If we know that the end result of this process of restructuring is great spatial 
inequality, one way to represent these transformations over time is by population changes 
in the comunas that represent the poorer and the wealthier sectors.  We would hope to see 
more population growth in wealthier comunas, and population decreases in poorer 
comunas. Figure 3.1 represents population changes for six comunas.   
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Population Change in Percent
1992-2002 2002-2009





La Pintana 13.2 2.5
Net Total in Greater Santiago 10.4 4.3  
Figure 3.4  Population Changes in Select Comunas Compared to Overall Net Increase of Greater Santiago 
Source: Author‟s elaboration from CASEN Household Survey 2006 
 
From 1992, which roughly coincides with the nation‟s return to democracy, to 2002, we 
see increases in population greater than the net overall increase in wealthy and poor 
comunas.  These include Las Condes, Maipú, Peñalolen and La Pintana, even though 
Maipú demonstrates population growth almost four times greater than the largest increase 
in Las Condes.  This trend continues for two of the three poorer comunas and one of the 
wealthier ones.  However, Vitacura, the comuna that consistently appeared in indicators 
of wealth, begins to show a decline in population.  Taken together, after three decades of 
neoliberal reforms the poor comunas grow disproportionately faster than the wealthy 
ones in terms of population, even while all grow in population.  Therefore, more and 
more people belong to both the wealthy and the poorer populations and inequality grows 
exponentially.   
Neoliberal policy instituted in this context of extreme inequality exacerbated 
inequities, favoring one type of collectivity (businesses with access to large capital 
reserves) at the expense of others (unions, small cooperatives, family businesses) as the 
former is already positioned to compete on the global marketplace through its ownership 
of and access to economic resources.  The traditional recourse of unions and cooperatives 
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for challenging concentration of economic resources and access to them was never 
restored; indeed, the economic policies of the Concertación barely differ from those of 
its‟ predecessor (Taylor 2006: 81). Rather, participation in the management of social 
services by their recipients has replaced involvement in institutions targeting economic 
inequity. (Taylor 2006: 81) 
  The maintenance of neoliberal economic policies suggests that there is little 
political recourse of collective institutions of the poor and working classes.  The 
purportedly left-wing Concertación has yet to reform key laws concerning these labor 
organizations even while governing from a political position that rhetorically claims to 
represent the interests of the working class.  The fragmentation of unions and their low 
membership numbers- 11% as of 2010 (Sepulveda 2010: 1)- illustrates this structural and 
normative shift brought about by trade liberalization in Chilean society.  Cooperative-
political linkages were similarly severed through the General Law of Cooperatives, 
enacted by Pinochet in 1973, which states that cooperatives must “maintain political and 
religious neutrality”(Departamento de Cooperativas). As unions were tied to political 
parties, collective political action of economically marginalized classes is threatened.  
Pinochet also outlawed the simultaneous holding of officer-ship in political parties and 
labor or professional organizations (Codevilla 1993: 133)- a law that was enforced only 
for those labor organizations and political parties representing the working and informal 
class.  This means that even where collective economic institution building in certain 
sectors is allowed it cannot have any political character. 
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Trends in inequality are often measured using the GINI coefficient.  However, 
recent research has shown that calculations of the GINI coefficient produce different 
numbers; some report stability, some decreases, and some increases (Spagnolo et. al 
2008: 1).  Therefore others have begun to calculate inequality based on pay, and using an 
alternative measure called the Theil Statistic that more clearly demonstrates fluctuations 
in inequality as well as who or what contributes positively and negatively to those 
changes (Spagnolo et al 2008: 2).  Therefore I use inequality as calculated using the 
Theil.  While inequality declined under the civilian government of the Concertación, it 
would not return to levels reported under Allende (Galbraith & Garza Cantu 1999: 5) in 
part due to this severance of institutions committed to economic equity and political 
parties that represent them from political power. 
Indeed the center-left coalition that has governed Chile since the return of 
democracy “lacks the redistributionist commitments of [its] democratic predecessors” 
(Galbraith & Garza Cantu 1999: 28) even though a center-left government in theory 
would be more attuned to the values of egalitarianism, equality and redistribution of 
wealth. However the Concertación has decisively distanced itself from the legacy of 
Allende‟s socioeconomic policies.  Although some significant policy changes were made 
regarding conditions of dismissals from jobs under the Concertación, the impacts of 
economic and social restructuring under Pinochet have yet to be adequately remedied as 
the ideological predisposition for a small State and for individual responsibility remains.   
An example of this categorical policy shift- from State led redistribution to laissez 
faire mechanisms- is the further emphasis on the production of high value added 
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industrial and technological exports whose comparative advantage is in part premised on 
lowering of tariffs from 15 to 5 percent as of 1998 (Spagnolo et al. 2008: 7).  
Government revenue lost to these tariffs was made up for through increases in the taxes 
of goods consumed domestically- thus the competitiveness of one sector of the economy, 
oriented towards foreign markets, comes at the expense of Chilean citizens forced into a 
regressive tax regime.  Many measures designed to make trade more flexible make 
inflexible the ability of many Chilean citizens to meet basic needs.  
While the onset of the Solidarity Economy predates the Bachelet presidency, 
which began in 2006, her reforms have been more aggressive than her predecessors in 
expanding the social services and safety net. Therefore, while not relevant to an analysis 
of why the Solidarity Economy emerged when it did, a brief description of her reforms 
will be useful as they pertain to activities and challenges of the Solidarity Economy in its 
current form.  Bachelet has made it her explicit goal to expand the welfare state (Ross 
2006: 731).   She has focused on giving women access to the labor force through free 
public day care centers (Ross 2006: 30), tripling their number (Barrionuevo 2009: 1).  As 
Chile has the lowest percentage of women active in the workforce in Latin America 
(Ross 2006: 730), this policy is significant. She passed a law to give everyone over 60 
free health care in public hospitals (Ross 2006: 731), and provided housing grants to 
600,000 families living in informal conditions (The Economist 2010). The poor 
conditions of public education were challenged in 2006 by 70,000 students dubbed “the 
Penguins” for their school uniforms, who protested and took over their schools to draw 
attention to the precarious physical infrastructure of many public schools (Fabrega 2010: 
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1).  In a show of solidarity, many private school students also protested, draping their 
school‟s fences with signs such as “Private, But Not Silent” (Fabrega 2010: 1).  Their 
protests won them almost 200 million dollars in increased investment in schools, free 
public transportation passes for students, and 200,000 more free meals (Desde Abajo 
2006). Overall, Bachelet‟s investments in social services are a fundamental departure 
from neoliberal orthodoxy, but may not be continued by her successor, the right wing 
president Sebastian Pinera.   
An Introduction to the Solidarity Economy in Chile 
The inception of the Solidarity Economy and its Solidarity Economy Network 
responds to the realization that political equality was not a sufficient condition for 
economic equality.  The Solidarity Economy and its Santiago Network of the Solidarity 
Economy are examples of social movements that have reacted to the economic and social 
transformations previously described.  Indeed, the Solidarity Economy Network explains 
on its website that it emerged as a result of “reflections around the effects of the 
neoliberal model on the popular sectors” (Red Economia Solidaria “Quienes Somos”). 
Brought together to form and support democratically-owned and managed 
businesses, environmentally and socially responsible consumption, and collective 
savings, this movement takes its base from a local i.e. spatial consciousness rather than 
one derived solely by class.  Portes and Roberts (2005, 76) note this trend when they 
write “the changing class and spatial structure of Latin American societies during the 
neoliberal period represents the common underlying matrix for all urban popular 
movements”. Contrary to Allende‟s projects, the Solidarity Economy movement sustains 
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itself without centralized political or financial State support.  Instead, the Solidarity 
Economy relies on a grassroots base, which itself is comprised of a multiplicity of actors 
including domestic and international NGOs, religious organizations and other local third 
sector institutions, many of whom established themselves within the pro-democracy 
movement of the 1970s and 1980s at the height of the spatial reorganization of the capital 
city. 
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Figure 3.5 Schematic of Founding Organizations of the Solidarity Economy Network of Chile 
Source: Author‟s Elaboration 
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 In 2001, almost a decade after the restoration of democracy, a group of 
individuals from various institutions founded the Solidarity Economy Network following 
a seminar organized by the Vicaria de Pastor Social entitled “Building Trust for a 
Solidarity Economy” (Red Economia Solidaria “Quienes Somos”).  This network is 
composed of representatives from NGOs and faith-based organizations, as well as 
representatives of typically neighborhood-level producer associations.  These groups are 
tied together with intellectuals active in the movement and networks from other regions 
of Chile and those of other Latin American countries. It is tasked with supporting 
communication between all of these different people.  In addition it presents the goals 
and activities of the Solidarity Economy to the greater Chilean public, with the effect of 
“positioning the Solidarity Economy in the public sphere from an ethical-moral focus” 
(Red Economia Solidaria “Quienes Somos”). 
 Whereas prior labor movements were tied to political parties, this collective has 
not sought, or has been unable to obtain, political representation.  It represents a split 
from the Socialist ideology of the Allende years and labor politics of the Old Left 
generally for two reasons.  Firstly, it democratically reorganizes the social economy- that 
is, NGOs, foundations, and other groups oriented to social services- because the praxis of 
participation is means and end. Secondly, by including those from the informal economy 
who would not belong to unions to begin with, it broadens the base of participants and is 
inclusive of their existing social structures.  Economic autonomy is thus realized through 
economic practice of the participants- working class or otherwise- as opposed to sought 
after exclusively through political policies and the parties that advance them.   
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  For the Solidarity Economy in Chile, a person is recognized as having valuable 
contributions to make in decision-making processes that affect them, which in turn 
creates a “democratic space that gives a feeling of belonging” (Red Economia Solidaria 
“Nuestros Principios Orientadores”).  This position comes out of the tradition of popular 
education proposed by Paulo Freire and utilized in the early 1960s in Chile, which 
advances the claim that education is not about “transferring knowledge” (Freire 2004: 12) 
from teacher to student but incorporating the sociocultural knowledge of the popular 
classes into their education through equitable student-student relationships (Freire 2004: 
15) (Mies 1973: 1776).  It empowers the poor to recognize their own capabilities and 
enforces parity between expert and local knowledge while also providing a space where 
individual experiences of poverty and marginalization can be shared and negotiated 
through a collective experience.  If one looks at their individual situation as an isolated 
phenomenon, the commonalities across individuals are obscured and systemic 
inequalities are seen as resulting from personal failures or idiosyncrasies.  Thus a 
disadvantaged worker in the informal economy would tend to see his or her struggles as 
the result of his/her own individual circumstances.  Once partnered on equal footing with 
those of a similar position, this individual is able to see his/her struggles reflected in the 
lives of others, and attribute them to structural characteristics experienced by many. 
This collective dimension of participatory development work is fundamental to 
the cause of the Solidarity Economy.  Government funds exist for economic capacity 
training with the goal of supporting microbusinesses, particularly from the Fondo 
Solidaridad y Inversion Social (FOSIS) program, which is ostensibly premised on active 
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participation of fund recipients.  However, these programs target individuals and “teach” 
them individual responsibility and “self-help” rather than capitalizing on the strong 
predilection for collective accountability and assistance that has survived the dictatorship.  
Even though this program also nominally requires individuals to be officially registered 
with an association, participation in that association is not monitored.  The Solidarity 
Economy is predisposed to a collective orientation- to solidarity- that is built around 
participation, and therefore fills an important gap in economic policy directed at the poor 
and working classes.   
 Solutions to poverty for the Solidarity Economy Network in Chile are advanced 
through other-oriented values described as the “C Factor” (Red Economia Solidaria 
“Quienes Somos”) or Confianza, Comunidad, Cooperación y Compartir (Trust, 
Community, Cooperation and Sharing).  The incentive to profit for profit‟s sake is 
critiqued when considered from a more integral vision of humans engaging in economic 
activity for its sociality, and as both a mechanism for economic exchange and the 
expression of community ethico-moral concerns.  This vision of economic actors stands 
in sharp relief to the neoclassical construction of economic behavior that sees the core 
tenet of cooperative building, social solidarity, to be irrational.  In one account of rate-
busting in the academic literature, a person who is able to produce more but is unwilling 
to do so out of notions of justice and solidarity with those who cannot is characterized as 
“nuts” (Elster 1989: 112).  That is, solidarity is rendered pathological, as it is at odds with 
the neoclassical construction of a rationally self-interested individual.  The Solidarity 
 72 
Economy in Chile‟s C Factor thus repudiates economic theories that render homus 
economicus as a solitary navel-gazer.  
 Thus the Solidarity Economy represents its own rationality.  For these actors, it is 
rational to act together not merely for practical purposes, but instrumental ones as well.  
Collectively the disadvantaged are able to have greater petition on the circumstances that 
control their lives, but solidarity is also about values of cooperation as their own ends.  In 
Chile, the predominance of Catholic institutions in the Network signifies the spiritual 
dimension of their commitment to “me and us” conceptions of the human economic 
community. While it is not the scope of this paper, it is important to mention that half of 
the solidarity economy producers are indigenous cooperatives of women, and thus utilize 
their own vision of reciprocity and solidarity between land, people, and past and future 
generations to explain and promote the broader Solidarity Economy agenda in their 
geographical and cultural context. 
 These various strains of thought are incorporated into the Network‟s purpose, 
described as “the promotion of the values and rationality of the Solidarity Economy”, 
which are based on “a way of organizing economic life [. . .] that organizes the 
productive processes around cooperative and associative relationships.”(Red Economia 
Solidaria “Quienes Somos”)   As such, what has been called community social capital 
(Durston 103) is as important as financial capital to the well-being and productivity of 
economic actors.  The economy is simply an aggregation of the many types of capital 
brought to it by its participants, and should be represented as such.  Therefore social 
capital intensive industries provide something more than what they materially produce- 
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stable relationships- which, in turn, have positive economic and political effects: reduced 
transaction costs, production of public goods and a sound civil society (Durston 1999: 
103). 
The following chapter is the case study of the Santiago Network of the Solidarity 
Economy and its relationship with the producers found in the vicinity of Santiago.  
Therefore, the case study‟s focus is on the Solidarity Economy‟s urban and generally 
mestizo constituents.  It will address how the Network is organized, including its 
mechanisms of participation, thereby describing both successes and failures of the 
Network in realizing its goal of participatory democracy.  This chapter will also depict 
the geographical distribution of participants, thus testing the hypothesis that the popular 
classes who were spatially redistributed under neoliberal reforms are those who join the 
Solidarity Economy movement. It will also respond to the question of how prior 
organizational affiliations motivate initial and sustained participation in the Network.  
Finally, the case study will address strategies for education and consciousness-raising 
both within and outside of the Network, and any debate that exists around their formation 
and implementation. Strategies regarding promotion of values speak to the internal 
coherence (or incoherence) of the SE movement, and perceived receptiveness of the 
general public, particular targeted civil society constituencies embedded in the 
neighborhoods of participants, and the local and national government agencies that the 
SE sees as potential allies.  Together the responses to these questions will reveal the 
response of a national iteration of an international social movement to neoliberal policy, 
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and from there the potential for the movement to address the social consequences of 






















Chapter 4: The Santiago Solidarity Economy Network  
This chapter will explore my research questions regarding the Santiago Solidarity 
Economy Network in Chile. During September and October of 2010 I interviewed six of 
a total of 11 Network representatives, two women and four men.  I also interviewed one 
male Network producer. During some of these interviews I took notes, and during others 
I recorded audio from the interview.  Other producers and Network representatives did 
not respond to requests for interviews due to the high level of production and activity 
required of them prior to the Christmas fair, and the short time frame in which I had to 
carry out my interviews. I was able to interview a significant number of Network 
representatives, and therefore their insights and commentary can be taken as 
characteristic of the positions of other Network representatives.  However one interview 
with a single producer cannot similarly represent the opinions of other producers, and 
therefore it is through participant observation of producers in meetings that I was able to 
access their perceptions of the Network.   I also interviewed one assessor from the 
capacity building, promotion and education division at the Department of Cooperatives to 
explore the State‟s perceptions of its evolving policies towards cooperatives, and their 
implications for the Solidarity Economy. While this person‟s interview cannot be 
expected to represent the totality of State perceptions of cooperative policy, it allowed me 
to explore further the themes of the interviews and meetings of the Solidarity Economy 
and connect them to an external framework outside of this small social movement. 
I also observed all five Network, commission-level and general meetings held during 
this time.  I was introduced to the group each time, and explained the purpose of my 
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presence at the meetings. On average, a majority of the organizations officially tied to the 
Network had representatives present at the meetings.  Around a third of the producers 
expected to participate in the Christmas fair were present at the general meeting.   I 
contributed to the meetings when my opinion was solicited directly, and took notes 
during discussions.  I have used pseudonyms for all interviewee names. 
I will begin by describing the structural and normative changes the Santiago 
Solidarity Economy Network is pursuing through the internal mechanisms of 
participation in place within the movement itself- the Network‟s practice of solidarity and 
democracy. The following section discusses the educational/conscious-raising strategies 
that the Network employs, and their relationship to the perceived social consequences of 
neoliberalism.   The subsequent section examines the history of the institutions in the 
Network, the personal histories of the individuals that represent those institutions, and 
how those personal and institutional histories inform the Network‟s tactics and 
capabilities.  The final section discusses the barriers to, and opportunities for, developing 
a Solidarity Economy in Santiago, Chile, integrating the themes of participation, 
educational strategies and institutional practice and applying them more broadly to the 
growth potential of an alternative economy in Santiago.   
“Development from Below and from Within”: Popular Education Strategies, 
Participation and Solidarity 
The Solidarity Economy movement in Chile proposes two central changes in the 
way that people engage in the economy in a neoliberal era.  First, it aims to empower 
individuals and restructure institutions so that impoverished people have more voice in 
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decision-making in the private and third sector. Second, it aims to shape the process and 
outcome of those decisions towards a collective, rather than individual, unit.  These two 
components- empowerment through democratic deliberation and collective 
responsibility- are the core from which strategies of education and processes of 
participation are extended.  Popular education models propose increased participation of 
producers in making decisions as both means and end. Therefore, participation for its 
own sake and participation as a process of forging collective solidarity are equally 
significant aims.  As this is a movement that is not engaged in politics, their efforts in 
empowering producers are aimed at increasing their voice in the workplace but firstly 
within the movement itself.  Therefore, the internal practice of participation is critical to 
realizing the Network‟s goals.  
In a presentation at one Network meeting, a Peruvian economist from the 
Solidarity Economy in his country suggested that popular education strategies needed to 
have both micro and meso-economic components (Network Meeting, 9/9/10).  The meso-
economic foci are those that target social phenomenon.  While these include health and 
education public policy, they also focus on “development from below, development from 
within”- or, changing individual attitudes, behavior, and beliefs, principally of those in 
the popular classes (Network Meeting 9/9/10).   
One Network institution, the Program of Economy and Work (PET, by its Spanish 
acronym), applies “development from within” through changing financial habits and 
consumer behavior of the workers who come to them for technical support and capacity 
building classes.  This institution was begun by the Archbishop of Santiago in an effort to 
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give a place for those expelled from the social sciences under the dictatorship to continue 
to pursue academic lines of investigation in areas such as free trade agreements, 
sustainable development, work education, collective bargaining, and social policy and 
participation (PETchile.cl “Quienes Somos).  These studies evolved into a program of 
capacity-building and economic advising for the popular classes and their economic 
organizations. 
One of the people I interviewed- a producer- who went to PET to take courses in 
business administration, came away from these popular education sessions profoundly 
changed.  A middle-aged man who finished 6
th
 grade at the age of 40, he lived in one of 
the many informal settlements in the southern edge of the city, known as tomas.  While 
always an entrepreneurial spirit, he did not feel that he was able to actualize his goals 
until his attitudes towards consumerism changed.  Through courses at PET and reading 
Luis Razeto, a Chilean academic who coined the term Solidarity Economy, he adopted a 
practice of responsible consumption.  This first implied that he should spend only on 
what he needed and, in so doing, would be able to save money and avoid “debt, which 
makes you a slave” (Miguel 9/22/10, interview).  He preferred “social interest to financial 
interest”- that is, the informal obligations of a loan obtained from an acquaintance, friend 
or family member over a formal agreement with an impersonal institution that would 
charge him usurious interest rates sometimes as high as 40 percent (Miguel 9/22/10, 
interview).  Instead of being required to pay extra money through high interest rates, he 
instead, in the instance of the loan his sister gave him to buy a car, felt obligated to loan 
her the car when she needed it.  Through this strategy, and the opportunity to educate 
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himself through PET classes and through a technical university, he was able to purchase 
his own home, with no monetary debt, where he now lives in the same municipality 
where he once lived precariously under zinc and plastic. 
 This interviewee indicated that reassessing his needs and wants, and the financial 
sources from which to fund these needs and wants, allowed him to then begin 
implementing a more responsible, socially oriented consumption strategy.  He privileges 
buying from those who are paid a fair wage and who create products that last and are of 
good quality, such as buying loafers from the local shoe smith (Miguel 9/22/10, 
interview). He then is also able to invest in his community- to demonstrate a social 
solidarity with his neighbors- as opposed to sending the profits from his purchases of 
imports to factory owners in distant communities or countries. Popular education 
strategies taught him how to reorder his preferences so that social solidarity takes 
precedence over price, when possible, in consumption decisions. 
However, this interviewee also admitted that changes in the financial priorities of 
families and broader communities also need to take place for households to see real 
advances (Miguel 9/22/10, interview). Each individual can act as that external 
intervention needed to provoke critical thinking.  This strategy, he acknowledges, has had 
limited success. He has encountered resistance from his wife, although more support 
from his children.  “My son is the one who reminds me to turn off the lights to save 
energy and money,” he told me.  So this producer has also formed a group from those 
who participated in PET classes to intervene in raising the consciousness of their 
neighbors and within their own households as to the value of reducing unnecessary 
 80 
consumption and focusing purchases on products that provide a higher wage to their 
manufacturers (Miguel 9/22/10, interview).  The material rewards of reprioritizing 
consumption and refocusing it towards social well-being are evident- this interviewee 
owns a home debt-free- yet this interviewee indicated that often instead of stimulating a 
process of critical reflection in his peers instead he inspired jealousy.   
Another challenge he encounters is the effect of living in a neighborhood that is 
socioeconomically homogenous, a product of the neoliberal restructuring detailed in prior 
chapters of this study.  He said that because there is so much poverty in one area, crime 
and unemployment are normalized as ordinary, natural (Miguel 9/22/10, interview).  
Dealing drugs and prostitution are regarded as a conventional economic activity because 
they are spatially concentrated in particular neighborhoods.  Thus alternatives to these 
activities are also less visible- and less viable- than in neighborhoods where legal 
activities are the norm.   
Even purposefully and consistently acting on the new values one has claimed as 
important is a challenge.  For example, after years of participation in the Solidarity 
Economy Network, many producers have trouble implementing the values of solidarity 
during the activities of the Network.  At the last Christmas fair in 2008, the first 
producers to arrive hoarded chairs and tables even though they knew that there were only 
two per association (General Meeting 10/12/10).  They also lied to the Network about 
how much they had sold.  One producer representative told me at the Commercialization 
commission meeting that when they asked producers how the Fair had gone for them, 
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“they would say it went terribly, even with an empty table right in front of them”-
meaning, all of their goods had been sold (Commission Meeting 10/8/10). 
Popular education efforts of the Network have tried to use these anecdotes to 
remind producers of just how little solidarity- how little trust- there is in the Network 
itself.  At one of the general meetings with the producers one of the Training commission 
members recapped to the group the anecdote about the chairs and table, and everyone 
laughed uncomfortably.  Another Training commission member then intervened and said 
to the group “at every step, we need to be asking ourselves, how untrusting am I?” 
(General Meeting 10/12/10). The Training commission also took the anecdote about 
falsified profits from the last Fair to explain why they would be requiring all producers, 
as a condition of participation in this year‟s Fair, to share their sales records with the 
Network.   
Another mechanism for promoting group solidarity, and financial transparency, 
was proposed by one of the Training team‟s members.  During a visit to a Solidarity 
Economy function in Uruguay, he witnessed something called the caja comun.  While 
every producer receives the money from each sale they make, the consumer pays to a 
central box where the money is later distributed accordingly.  The producer still benefits 
monetarily from the transaction, and socially from the interaction with the consumer, yet 
a sense of collectivity is established for producers and the consuming public.   
However, the trust needed for a caja comun to be implemented is a key obstacle.  
In the Training team‟s discussions at their commission meeting, other members derided 
the idea, saying that the producers did not have a “sufficient level of consciousness” 
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(Commission Meeting 9/24/10) to give over control to a central sales station.  Others 
thought that the public would be impatient with the idea and the extra time it would take 
to purchase their goods (Commission Meeting 9/24/10).  They eventually decided to first 
propose the idea to the rest of the Network.  Ironically, it was those Network 
representatives who were producers themselves who most enthusiastically supported the 
idea, explaining that in their own neighborhood-level producer associations some of them 
had even used a caja comun themselves.  When this idea was proposed to the producers 
themselves at the meeting for the Fair, producers unequivocally supported the idea, 
saying that some of them had used a caja comun, although in groups with smaller 
numbers and in which the members were more familiar with one another.   
This anecdote demonstrates the strength of an inclusive model of participation 
that puts decision-making in the hands of those affected by those decisions.  Firstly, 
producers participating directly in the Network were able to act on their experiences and 
challenge the opinions of others who doubted their commitment to and readiness for a 
caja comun.  Secondly, by deciding to also propose the idea, rather than dismissing it 
from the beginning, the general body of producers was able to reinforce the legitimacy of 
their representatives and teach others in the Network what they were capable of and 
interested in undertaking.  The process of decision-making- leaving controversial issues 
open to debate for all involved- legitimizes a course of action through broad participation.  
Collective responsibility for decisions, whether they fail or succeed, is the outcome.  
Furthermore, a more diverse spread of options are available when even the most unlikely 
courses of action are proposed to the group. 
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 In the course of discussing the caja comun at the Training commission‟s meeting, 
the members debated what popular education and consciousness-raising means.  One 
Network representative in the Training commission meeting said that it does not imply 
simply allowing people to do what they want, since “they will continue to ask for Las 
Ultimas Noticias” (referencing a popular but low-brow daily newspaper) (Commission 
Meeting 9/24/10). This Network representative said that the producers should decide 
whether to have a caja comun, but that popular education is not simply “giving people a 
space” but about teaching about other possibilities and their merits (Commission Meeting 
9/24/10).   Another Network representative echoed this sentiment.  He said “everyone has 
their own field of action based on their experience and history, and will continue to repeat 
the same actions without external intervention” (Commission Meeting 9/24/10).  
Therefore, while they decided to put the idea to a group decision, the Training team 
recognized the need to educate producers as to the benefits, and potential challenges, of 
implementing a “symbolic gesture” (Pancho 9/24/10, Commission Meeting) of solidarity 
like the caja comun. 
The Network has been unable, like the PET interviewee, to engender broad 
internal solidarity, yet interventions such as the caja comun are a start.  The annual Fair, 
the Network‟s largest event, is only in its second year.  They hold few such massive 
events that bring together all producers of the Network and thus have few opportunities to 
create solidary bonds between networks located in different parts of the city.  While 
within each producer association, most of which are affiliated by comuna, producers 
know one another well and have more regular contact, at the level of the Network 
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producers are familiar with each other but do not have the sustained contact necessary to 
build trust.   
The Network also does not appear to capitalize on the few opportunities it has all 
of the producers gathered to produce group cohesion.  At the meeting for the Christmas 
fair, the Network did not have nametags so that everyone would know each other‟s name 
and affiliation.  They did not take the time to do an icebreaker or activities in small 
groups.  The Network members in fact employed a very traditional style of lecturing to 
the producers, with the speaker standing in the front of a large room and the producers 
sitting down in rows in front of them.  With so few physical meetings of all producers, 
this was a chance to build a group identity that was lost.  
 In a survey that the Network conducted of all of the producers who participated 
in the 2008 Fair, the producers were asked what they would change about the event or 
Network.  13 of 72 responses were related to the need to have more group activities and 
create a stronger Network bond between disparate producer associations (Author‟s Tally, 
Nomina de Productores).  Almost a quarter of the producers feel that there are few 
opportunities to get to know one another, and that this shortage of opportunity represents 
the most important area of change in the way the Fair and the Network operate.  At the 
most recent producer meeting, many producers reflected on this limitation, suggesting 
“let‟s be friends”, “let‟s have a Facebook page” and “let‟s get together before the fair to 
get to know one another and our products” (General Meeting 10/12/10).  None of these 
suggestions were taken up by the Training leaders heading the meeting, and thus the 
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producers will be responsible for organizing these activities and contacting one another.  
However, only one Network member has the full email list of all producers. 
Participation in meetings is also conducted in a traditional manner.  When the 
Training team proposed the ideas of the Fair to the group, they wrote the main themes 
down on a whiteboard.  These were predetermined by the commission, and were 
associativity, trust, and responsible consumption.  The first two values were to be 
internally directed at the Fair‟s producers, and the last at the consuming public although 
the first two values would be on display for the public to see.  When the commission 
members asked the producers for ideas regarding how best to physically showcase the 
first two values in the Fair, people raised their hands and were called on.  However, their 
suggestions were not written on the whiteboard, and the commission members did not 
show active listening by repeating to the group what the suggestions were.  It was unclear 
how strategies of empowerment were implemented at this meeting except through the 
symbolic gesture of simply asking for ideas.  Furthermore, of the five members of the 
Training team, only one is actually a producer himself, and he was not at the meeting that 
decided the themes of the fair, nor standing up at the meeting of the producers to lead the 
discussion.   
Beyond prompting producers for suggestions on pre-determined themes, the 
Training team had little if any input on the part of the producers and disproportionate 
input of certain non-producer representatives.  This has already proven a challenge for the 
Network, who would like to see the Fair planned and implemented by the producers 
themselves as opposed to by the institutions of the Network.  However, the Network is 
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not only heavily populated by non-producers- of which half of the roughly 12 participants 
are employees of NGOs and faith-based institutions- but also greater de facto power of 
decision-making of these non-producers by virtue of their higher levels of attendance at 
meetings  Not only are non-producers more active in making decisions, one individual 
representing one institution is responsible for the organization and implementation of the 
economically significant activities that the Network undertakes.  In the example of the 
Fair, one institution contracted the space for the Fair, solicited donations for 
infrastructure, constructed a budget for needed materials and staff, and took legal 
responsibility for the space through signing a contract with the venue. 
The proportionally large resources of this one institution, in relationship to other 
NGOs and to the producer associations themselves, have translated into the Network‟s 
reliance on those resources in order to carry out its activities.  Materially, this 
organization has a larger budget, staff, and physical space for the Network to draw upon.  
Meetings are often held in their office.  The Network representative from this 
organization is the contact on the Network‟s website and is the person most often visited 
and phoned when producers have questions and concerns (Clara 9/15/10, interview).  
Socially, this organization has greater public visibility through its connections to the 
Catholic Church.  Its director is a known public figure who has used his social status to 
obtain discounts and donations on the Network‟s behalf.    
The Network is not an independent organization, and thus must necessarily rely 
on the resources of its constituents.  However, a disproportional contribution of 
representatives jeopardizes the sustainability of the Network and also threatens the 
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equitable participation of producers and non-producers alike.  Producers do not learn how 
to plan the Fair, for example, how to deal with complex legal documents such as 
contracts, or how to solicit large-scale donations of expensive items such as Fair 
infrastructure.  The producers are not empowered as entrepreneurs to develop a more 
socioeconomically diverse clientele.  Non-producer representatives are also not obligated 
to put demands on their institutions for greater material and social investment in the 
Network.  As one interviewee said to me, “the [organization name] carries the Network” 
(Clara 9/15/10, interview)- a phrase that conjures up a paternalism that the Network 
explicitly wants to avoid. 
On a personal level, however, the Network representatives have adopted a 
practice oriented towards group cohesion and sociability.  The Network representatives 
gather periodically for what they call “mitotes” (Mario 9/30/10. interview).  They go 
away for a weekend and share meals, “drink good wine” (Mario 9/30/10, interview) and 
“put flesh on solidarity” (Mario 9/30/10, interview).  In other words, they maintain 
friendships.  As one interviewee told me, a UN report came out recently that Chileans do 
not trust eight out of ten of their fellow compatriots (Pancho 10/6/10, interview).  He 
joked, “we have two friends per capita” (Pancho 10/6/10, interview).  Mitotes are 
attempts to, as a group, change that statistic. The consensus-building that Network 
representatives engage in, the fondness with which they all spoke of one another 
(referring to other Network representatives in interviews as “the kids”), and the candor 
they employed in dealing with differences of opinion speak to the successful 
accomplishment of solidary practices that do not preclude disagreement.   
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Consequently the creation of prefigurative spaces (Breines 1980: 419), where the 
Network members embody the values they promote in the internal organization of the 
movement, has had uneven success.  Internally, the Network has great personal 
camaraderie, yet overly relies on the resources and connections of one institution, which 
then makes many decisions on behalf of the group as a whole.  Between the Network and 
producers, one interviewee said to me in a Commission meeting “the network carries 
solidarity” (Commission Meeting 9/24/10).  Yet it would be more accurate to say that the 
Network representatives carry solidarity, as the producers who also form the Network are 
not engaged on a routine basis with group bonding exercises or activities- either between 
groups or between groups and the Network.  They are more concerned with processes of 
commercialization of their products, as the Network‟s survey of the last Fair indicated: of 
72 responses, a full 51 were in reference to opportunities for reaching new markets and 
physical design and implementation of the Fair (Author‟s Tally, Nomina de Productores).  
The preoccupation with the commercial aspect of the Solidarity Economy substantiates 
the claim that one interviewee made when he said “the value in the Network has been in 
maintaining alive this idea” (Pancho 10/6/10, interview) rather than in generating 
substantial material benefits. However, in practicing this idea with and for larger groups, 
even with those formally linked to the Network, this organization has had more uncertain, 
and perhaps uneven, effects.   Preparations for and operation of the Fair, intended both as 
internal group exercise and “a counterpoint” for the public (Commission Meeting 
9/24/10), as a Fair to be “lived differently” (Commisison Meeting, 9/24/10), is an 
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example of the challenges of participation and consciousness-raising that the Network 
routinely encounters given the limited resources of its members. 
“The Whole World Took Refuge in Pastoral Life”: The Institutional and 
Generational Composition of the Network 
 The strategies of participation and consciousness-raising, and furthermore the 
ability of the Network to create a coalition to advance their objectives, is partly 
conditioned by the history and concerns of the institutions that comprise the Network.  
This section will focus on those institutions that are faith-based, specifically Christian 
and Catholic, and on the work that they undertook and the populations they focused on 
directly prior to and during the dictatorship and the implementation of neoliberal policy.  
Their activities during this time period greatly inform the shape and content of the 
Solidarity Economy Network of the present day, and thus are a significant component of 
an analysis of the effectiveness and future trajectory of this movement. 
Of the 11 founding institutions of the Network, six are faith-based. Christian and 
Catholic groups undertook a new agenda in the 1960s “to build active subjects who could 
stand on their own two feet” (Pancho 10/6/10, interview).  Church policy was to extend 
egalitarian community structures, such as those found in some monk communities, out 
into the lay world.  At this time Church intellectuals in Latin America were exploring the 
relationship of theology and economics, looking to their belief systems for guidance in 
how to embed their spiritual values in the material world of the economy.  The German 
Christian Democratic party sent one Church academic to Chile, Franz Hinkellamert, 
where he met Brazilian Hugo Assman who was exiled from his country and came to 
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Chile (Pancho 10/6/10, interview).  When they were expelled under Pinochet, two others, 
other Latin Americans joined them in San Jose, Costa Rica to begin a research institute 
known as the Ecumenical Department of Research (DEI by its Spanish acronym) (Pancho 
10/6/10, interview).  Their work inspired others, one a future member of the Network, to 
continue to explore the actualization of spiritual tenets in economic life.   
Church intellectuals and activists then actively applied their theological 
interpretations of the economy to capacity-building work with marginalized communities, 
thus shifting their focus from charity to empowerment.  Under the dictatorship of 
Pinochet, churches therefore became active in economically organizing and sheltering the 
popular classes; in fact, five of the six faith-based institutions in the Network were 
dedicated to this mission.  Some, including the Vicaria de Pastoral Social and Centro 
Ecumenico de Diego de Medellin, were established in the 1970s as a specific response to 
the dictatorship and the effects of its economic policies on the popular classes.   
As Pinochet‟s regime left only churches to relative autonomy, pastoral life formed 
an umbrella for the associative activities previously held by unions, neighborhood 
associations, and political parties at the level of the popular classes.  One interviewee 
remarked “the whole world took refuge in pastoral life” (Mario, interview).  Church 
organizations became the big tent for all those targeted for repression by the dictatorship 
and struggling to survive economic reforms.  Various interviewees remarked that they 
became activists in their years as university students not through student groups or 
political action but through pastoral organizations. 
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From a need for survival, community kitchens or comedores were started, 
cooperatives known as bolsas de trabajo were organized, and other collective economic 
strategies were employed by church groups in marginal neighborhoods to fill the 
employment and social services needs generated by neoliberal reforms (Pancho 10/6/10, 
interview).  In addition, the collective dimension of religious communities served to 
reinforce the economic associativity of the popular classes.  As one interviewee said, 
“religious life is lived in communities” (Pancho 10/6/10, interview); faith is a joint 
venture.  As such, faith and trust are densely woven together.  He also observed, “If you 
do not trust anyone, you cannot trust in God” Pancho 10/6/10, interviewee) Therefore the 
basis for solidarity and associativity- trust- becomes a spiritual matter.  Group economic 
endeavors grown from religious communities, although predicated first and foremost on 
survival, also revolved around spirituality as experienced in collectivity. 
Churches‟ ability to assist the popular classes in surviving was significant, yet it 
remains to be seen whether its interventions into economic activities have been successful 
in bringing people out of poverty.  As faith-based groups have focused on an integral 
vision of human well-being, they have been limited in their ability to create proactive 
entrepreneurs who have the vision to search for new markets, become more efficient, and 
ultimately improve products.  They are skilled at fulfilling spiritual needs, yet are 
constrained by their lack of business knowledge. 
Although the Network has three commissions- Training, Promotion, and 
Commercialization- the institutions that are most active in the Network are those who are 
experienced in training.  This commission creates spaces for reflection on the values of 
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the Solidarity Economy and collectively exploring how to live these values as a network 
of producers.  However, given the precarious economic situation of many producers, this 
process is overly time-consuming.  As one interviewee indicated, there is “an excess of 
democracy” in the Network (Joaquin 10/6/10, interview).  This interviewee also 
suggested that those institutions in the Network whose representatives are not producers 
themselves do not understand the burden of this process of reflection.  Three hour 
meetings on the meaning of solidarity take away time that a producer needs to be 
generating income.  Many Network participants from faith groups recognize that when 
meetings are required for entrance into the annual Christmas fair, for example, attendance 
rates improve.  That is, the use value of meetings for production ends is increased.  In 
Network meetings this was attributed to the fact that producers are focused on producing, 
not on reflecting.  In my observations of these meetings, no one proposed solutions for 
resolving this tension. In fact most interviewees from faith-based groups continued to 
emphasize the need for spaces for reflection, even when the practice of reflection appears 
to be in direct conflict with the material priorities of the producers the Network 
represents.  
One former member of the Network, the Fundacion Solidaridad, effectively left 
the Network when it felt that the process of participation was too time consuming 
(Pancho 10/6/10, interview).  This foundation chose to focus exclusively on 
commercialization processes instead of training processes, which has yielded a number of 
government contracts, including one making toys that will be Christmas presents that the 
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state copper company, CODELCO, gives to its employees in December (Pancho 10/6/10, 
interview).   
The Solidarity Economy, State Policy and Autonomy  
However, one interviewee also suggested that this organization left the Network 
because, as it began to receive government contracts, it could no longer be critical of 
State policy (Pancho 10/6/10, interview).  In other words, forsaking training processes 
and their critique of the status quo jeopardizes the Network‟s ability to act an autonomous 
civil society actor.  Under the dictatorship church communities grew accustomed to their 
role as a critical node of resistance against the dictatorship.  Those in the Network who 
worked in opposition groups value their ability to dissent, and thus be autonomous from 
the State, and therefore remain suspicious of engaging with the State even to increase 
commercial opportunities for producers. 
The connection between the Solidarity Economy network and political parties or 
the State is virtually nonexistent as a result.  While ecumenical and Catholic communities 
in popular neighborhoods are well-organized and perhaps well-connected to one another, 
they are not linked to political parties that advance an economic policy agenda.  The 
Network has inherited this schism between the social/spiritual field and the economic 
field in relationship to public policy and politics.  While it has not been an advocate for 
revision of legislation or a proponent of new legislation that affects the economic lives of 
its participants, it does not have the contacts with the political world were it to decide to 
propose an agenda.   
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One Network representative suggested that this was also due to the belief by the 
popular classes “that the State is not going to give them anything” (Pancho 10/6/10, 
interview), and thus have chosen non-political paths for economic change.  This 
conviction, that the State is unresponsive, explains why when FOSIS (Fondo de 
Solidaridad y Inversion Social) approached the Network to begin a partnership, the 
Network was slow to respond (Pancho 10/6/10, interview).  Network members were 
surprised that the State would be interested in investing in associative and collective-
oriented economic development projects.  Regardless, a partnership was established in 
2008, but with the election of the right-wing Sebastian Pinera, and thus changing 
priorities in the government, that alliance has since dissolved. 
This same Network representative also suggested that the fight for democracy left 
everyone “tired of struggling” (Pancho 10/6/10, interview), and therefore unable to 
confront the Concertación when it became clear that it would continue the neoliberal 
policies of the Pinochet years.  It was also suggested by one Network representative that 
the Concertación effectively co-opted all of the associative energy created under the 
dictatorship when it gained political power, redirecting organizing efforts to elections at 
the expense of economic organizing (Joaquin 10/6/10, meeting).  The socioeconomic 
organizations of the popular classes under Pinochet, whose values were lived “on the 
flower of the skin” (Pancho 10/6/10, interview), relinquished their power to the political 
apparatus that they assumed would represent their interests and concerns.  One group, the 
Vicaria de la Solidaridad, whose economic organizing and human rights work most 
compellingly connected the Catholic church to resistance to the dictatorship, even closed 
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down once democracy returned, assuming that their work was done (Clara 10/6/10, 
interview).  One network member who worked for them at the time was later hired by the 
Vicaria de Pastoral Social, which was opened in 1992 to begin again the task of 
organizing and capacitating the popular classes in the economic sphere given the 
limitations, if not total absence, of Concertación policy remedies to under and 
unemployment and perceived lack of commitment to social solidarity. 
Current public policies towards associative practices do not generate sustainable 
associations because they promote collectivities in name only.  As one interviewee at the 
Department of Cooperatives stated “associative policy is not associativism” (Patricia 
10/13/10, interview).  For example, producer representatives attributed their fluctuating 
membership to the requirement by FOSIS that producers belong to an association.  Once 
funds were obtained from FOSIS, members left.  One interviewee said that then the 
government declares that associative practices do not work (Patricia 10/13/10, interview), 
even though participation is central to strong associations, and public policy does not 
regulate participation.  The Department of Cooperatives likewise does not consistently 
regulate participation, merely requesting basic details of how decisions were made by the 
cooperative in an annual report called the Ficha de Datos (Patricia 10/13/10, interview).   
Public policy priorities with regards to associative activities, and in particular 
cooperatives, favor supervision and regulation rather than capacity training and 
promotion.  This is in part due to the funding priorities of international agencies like the 
IDB that have invested almost exclusively in regulation.  For example, before the IDB 
granted the Department of Cooperatives funds, there were only three staff members.  
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After receiving funds, the Department‟s staff increased to 35, although only three of 
those 35 staff works on promotion and training (Patricia 10/13/10, interview).  The 
remaining employees are focused exclusively on regulatory and supervisory activities.   
Furthermore, associative practices face an unfair regulatory apparatus.  
Cooperatives are charged an additional tax to fund the agencies that regulate and 
supervise them.  This practice has prompted a lawsuit against the Department of 
Cooperatives (Patricia 10/13/10, interview) that has not yet been resolved.  These are 
examples of areas where the Solidarity Economy could promote changes in laws and 
scope of government agencies to create a more favorable legal environment for the 
associativism that they endorse. 
Philosophical Differences in the Santiago Solidarity Economy Network 
Another limit on the organizational strategies of the Network is generational, and 
thus ideological.  Those who worked in resistance movements under the tutelage of faith-
based organizations also carry with them into the Network ideological opposition to 
certain economic sectors.  Contrary to Solidarity Economy efforts in other Latin 
American countries, the Network in Chile has not cemented institutional connections 
with the cooperative sector, for example.  One interviewee indicated that this is because 
the cooperative sector sees itself as distinct and separate from the Solidarity Economy, a 
split she also observed in international meetings with other networks of the Solidarity 
Economy in Medellin, Colombia (Clara 10/6/10, interview).  This same participant 
claimed that the cooperative sector in Chile, in particular in savings and credit, is 
profoundly conservative, and thus not an ally of the Solidarity Economy. 
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Another declared that cooperatives were an outmoded form in Chile that had long 
ago been corrupted by the same social malaise of disengagement that permeates the rest 
of the country (Mario 9/30/10, interview).  He suggested that, in the case of housing 
cooperatives, while people indeed formed cooperative associations to purchase land and 
homes together, once that property was obtained no meaningful community participation 
or communal investment was made.  People remained, as one interviewee put it, “closed, 
shut up, quieted, fearful, and untrusting” (Pancho 10/6/10, interview).  He also suggested 
that cooperatives were coopted by leaders who took over effective control of decision 
making processes, even leading to cases of corruption such as a truck bought collectively 
being stolen (Pancho 10/6/10, interview).  The lack of genuine participation in 
cooperatives even leads to instances of systemic fraud, such as the case of the housing 
cooperative HABITACOOP that eventually went bankrupt in 2001.  13,000 members 
were affected. in 2001, which generated widespread outcry and spurned new laws and 
regulation of the cooperative sector as a whole (Patricia 10/13/10, interview).  
Others in the Network, in particular the younger members, are unconvinced that 
the model of cooperatives in and of themselves would not provide a fruitful vehicle for 
socioeconomic change.  One Network representative, who is a member of a cooperative 
that advises other cooperatives on administration, accounting, and capacity-building, said 
“the Solidarity Economy depends not on the subject, but on how the subject acts” 
(Joaquin 10/6/10, interview).  This statement is not directed at the values actualized by 
producers- that is, by the enactment of those reflections on the meaning of solidarity- but 
the structural form that businesses take as practice of those values.   
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For this same interviewee, the idea of democratic participation in business is what 
brought him to the Solidarity Economy.   His background in business administration 
brought him into contact with the private sector, a connection virtually non-existent 
through other institutions in the Network.  In particular, his contact with the business 
world was not limited to those enterprises started by the popular classes.  Therefore, for 
him, the Solidarity Economy is not necessarily nested around the poor.  This is why he 
believes that connections with the cooperative sector are necessary, because 
“cooperativism does not begin with poverty, it begins with a model”, and therefore is not 
anti-business or anti-upper classes (Joaquin 106/10, interview).  The ideological 
opposition of an older generation, and institutional focus against, these economic sectors 
and social classes limits its ability to more expansively conceive of the Solidarity 
Economy, and to establish the necessary intra-class links needed to grow the Solidarity 
Economy beyond the peripheral sectors of the economy. 
The institutional composition of the Network and generational differences of 
opinion have had significant negative impacts on previous organizing efforts.   A fairly 
expansive network of Solidarity Economy producers was established in the southern zone 
of the city in the early 1990s by many who would later formally establish the Solidarity 
Economy network.  One of the main organizers of that venture indicated at a meeting that 
one of the problems they encountered was that, given the fair, but relatively high, price of 
the goods being sold, the producers were unable to buy one another‟s products 
exclusively, as they had once hoped to do (Network Meeting 9/9/10).  This organizer put 
the question to the group of what could be done about this situation, and no one 
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responded.  It was clear to me, however, that the lack of business contacts and intra-class 
connections restricted potential consumers with greater material resources from investing 
in these efforts simply because they did not belong to the popular classes and thus were 
not connected to markets supported by ecumenical and Catholic churches. 
Other sources of funding have also been regarded with great suspicion, if not total 
rejection, by some of the older members of the Network representing faith-based 
institutions. The Interamerican Development Bank has invested millions of dollars 
through Fundacion AVINA in creating, for example, Mercosur Solidario, a space for the 
Solidarity Economy in the trade bloc Mercosur.  Members of the Network from the 
southern regions of the country are heavily supported by AVINA, whose sources of 
financial support are regarded with skepticism by many in the Santiago Network given 
the history of the IDB in supporting neoliberal policy. Indeed, the IDB‟s offers for 
microcredit loans were rejected by President Lula in Brazil specifically because the 
Solidarity Economy in that country was against financial instruments targeting only 
individuals and not associations or cooperatives (Pancho 10/6/10, interview).  Because 
the Chilean government has not rejected the microcredit model but has, in fact, 
enthusiastically embraced it, it seems that the Network has decided that it is their 
responsibility to reject funding from institutions that have so actively promoted it.   
This strategy is seen by a younger Network representative as erroneous.  Indeed, 
his business works with larger, conservative cooperatives and non-cooperatives alike in 
order to generate funds to support what he views as the central mission of his business: to 
build a Solidarity Economy and increase worker participation through cooperatives 
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(Joaquin 10/6/10, interview).   He said in an interview, “Who cares where the money 
comes from?” Furthermore, the deliberation required to tease out the symbolic meaning 
of accepting funds from questionable sources directly affects the ability of the Network to 
make decisions quickly.  When the Network was offered funds from the IDB, for 
example, it took them four separate monthly meetings to finally decide whether to accept 
those funds or reject them (Joaquin 10/6/10, interview).    
The Network‟s faith-based organizations‟ history of working with the popular 
classes also restricts its connections to union organizations, a coalition member that has 
proven so fruitful in other countries in which the Solidarity Economy functions, such as 
Brazil.  Because many in the informal sector were not in manufacturing, and were often 
ex-public employees, they were not connected to unions.  Thus the majority of the 
organizations that represent producers are artisans or produce sellers in the ferias libres, 
not industrial cooperatives or members of other traditionally unionized sectors.  Again, a 
model such as a union that functions around solidarity and collective action is 
ideologically in line with the ethical and structural changes that the Solidarity Economy 
seeks to consolidate.  However, due to a historical focus of faith groups on non-unionized 
sectors of the popular classes, the Network‟s strategy of network-building has failed to 
link up with potential allies. 
Even the younger generation of the Network is not convinced that union 
partnerships are a good strategy.  One Network representative said that unions, like many 
groups who were singled out and repressed under the dictatorship, are inherently 
oppositional in their stance (Joaquin 10/6/10, interview).  This interviewee said that he 
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would sum up the union position as “business bad, unions good”, and this belief limits 
their ability to build a broad coalition and spur a culture of entrepreneurship (Joaquin 
10/6/10, interview).   
The generational differences between older and younger members are highly 
pronounced in other ways as well.  Younger participants and non-participants in the 
cooperative sector also, are more comfortable with professionalization, efficiency 
concerns, scaling up, and ultimately with competition.  As one interviewee at the 
Department of Cooperatives put it, “our goal is not to increase the number of 
cooperatives but to increase the number of members in cooperatives”- in other words, to 
consolidate smaller businesses (Patricia 10/13/10, interview).  This same interviewee also 
indicated that this strategy is something that generates better products and services, and 
has been adopted by the most successful cooperative sector (and also the most politically 
conservative), the savings and credit institutions that comprise the majority of the 
cooperative sector in Santiago.  Small in size, in other words, often means inefficient and 
insignificant.  Another Network representative once suggested to an older Network 
representative from a faith-based institution that the Network should attempt to obtain 
accounting services for the producers so that they not every person would have to learn 
the more complicated aspects of running a business (Joaquin 10/6/10, interview).  Her 
response was “we should not underestimate the producers”.  While the motivation behind 
this response- that the popular classes should be taught, rather than have things done for 
them- is central to popular education strategies employed by church institutions, it also 
burdens producers with the requirement of becoming professionals in every aspect of 
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business management, manufacturing the products they will be selling, and also 
supporting themselves on the profit earned from those products.   
Another restriction of Solidarity Economy Network results from his attempts to 
realize gender equality in the movement.  As the Solidarity Economy is a proponent of 
equity in all dimensions of economic life, it has tried to bring women into economic self-
sufficiency through participation in the labor market.  Because faith-based groups in the 
Network worked with women who are part of the popular classes, they continue to focus 
on the elaboration of products associated with the traditionally domestic sphere, as this is 
the existing skill set of this particular demographic.  These include blankets, tablecloths, 
and other sewn products such as clothing.  As a survival strategy, the extra income from 
the sale of these goods is successful.  As a coalition-building strategy, however, this has 
led to a Network composition of largely middle-aged and older women with a restricted 
skill set.  Of the 39 attendants to the Christmas fair meeting for producers, only five 
producers were men, and 29 of the women were middle-aged to elderly (General Meeting 
10/12/10).  In a Network database of the products that producers make, 40 workshops are 
registered as working on textiles and 17 on jewelry of a total of 116 (Author‟s Tally, 
Nomina de Productores).  All 116 workshops are registered as producing artisanal 
decorations, clothing, jewelry, or food products (author‟s elaboration, Nomina de 
Productores).  While capitalizing on women‟s existing skills in the domestic sphere does 
contribute to economic self-sufficiency, it does not contribute to developing new skills, 
bringing existing skills to new markets, or even bringing women into higher paying 
positions in other sectors of the economy. 
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Given the limited civil society linkages that the Network thus far has formed, it 
would seem that the Network in Santiago will remain small in its impact.  However, a 
younger generation has begun to take an interest.  This is due to the investment that 
universities have made in studying and promoting the Solidarity Economy and 
cooperativism.  The influence of one individual, Luis Razeto, is significant.  Almost 
every Network member with university-level education quotes from his books and is 
familiar with his theories, and well as personally connected to him as a student or through 
the Network‟s work.  At every meeting attended, his name and work came up.  His 
influence on the social sciences, particularly at La Universidad de Chile and the 
Universidad Pablo Hurtado, led to the later interest of one Network member in 
reassessing business management from a participatory angle (Joaquin 10/6/10, 
interview).  Students from the University of Chile have recently come to study the 
Solidarity Economy Network after becoming familiar with his work (Ignacia 9/30/10, 
conversation), and the Network has expressed an interest in holding more activities in 
universities so as to include a new generation of Chileans in their activities and solidify 
academic-civil society connections (Network Meeting 9/30/10).  The Network members 
expressed the need to grow their organization so as not to see “the same people as 
always” at their events (Network Meeting 9/30/10).  Expanding the Network through 
intergenerational diversity may lead to further variety in the social classes and economic 
sectors that younger participants belong to heterogeneity of the student body at both 
public and private institutions.  These universities themselves are linked to other 
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universities in the capital city, and those connections can broaden the Network‟s impact 
and pool of adherents.   
Other Obstacles to Growth: Guaranteed Consumers, The Municipality as State, and 
Neoliberal Spaces 
 In addition to the restrictions of the Solidarity Economy Network inherent in its 
institutions and the conflict between efficiency and democracy, there are a number of 
other factors that challenge the Network‟s goal of growing their coalition and influence.  
All of these factors are related in some way to the enactment of a neoliberal model of 
governance and free market finance and to the spatial reordering of the city that took 
place under Pinochet.  These components complicate solidarity, organization, and 
commercialization processes of the Network. 
Firstly, in all of the meetings I attended and in nearly all of the interviews I 
completed, members mentioned the debilitating effects of increased access to credit on 
efforts to organize collectivities into economic units.  Firstly, credit to individuals 
releases the broader political and socioeconomic community from responsibility for that 
individual‟s failure.  One Network representative said, “Now the government and society 
can say, we gave you the money, and you, you failed, on your own” (Pancho 10/6/10, 
interview).  Secondly, credit becomes a substitution for training and capacity-building, as 
if the only thing that small producers lack is access to more money for investment.  For 
example, one interviewee spoke of the effect of free-market policies on her family in a 
rural area in the South.  She said that once the economy was so dramatically opened up, 
rural farmers were largely unable to compete.  She said that one government minister, in 
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response to these complaints, announced “if they don‟t know what to do with a cow, then 
tell them to eat it” (Patricia 10/13/10, interview)- effectively, the government was not 
responsible for transitioning rural farmers over to a more open economy.  The only 
investment the government made was in extending them credit, with interest.  This 
interviewee said that by and large those who took the credit were worse off than those 
who did not, as they were still unable to compete and furthermore were faced with 
mounting debt that they could not pay (Patricia 10/13/10, interview).   
Credit also allows an individual to act alone without the social obligations that 
collective economic organizing requires.  It acts as an escape valve on collective action.  
One effort of certain Network institutions in the 1980s, called “Comprando Juntos” 
(Buying Together), was quite successful until the arrival of widespread credit availability.  
Once people did not need to buy products together, they chose not to (Network Meeting 
9/24/10), instead preferring to pay high interest rates to finance individual consumption.   
The challenge that credit presents for collective economic organizing thus 
explains why some consciousness-raising strategies are geared towards rethinking 
consumption practices, both of the general public and of the producers themselves.  If 
people adopt an ethic of reduced consumption- an ethic that has been called Buen Vivir 
(Living Well)- then they are less likely to incur large debt for purchases that they cannot 
afford on their earnings alone.  The ability of the Network to educate their members and 
the larger public as to the consequences of excessive debt will greatly determine whether 
producers will be open to working together as associations. 
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Another challenge that the Network will continue to face are the effects of 
guaranteed consumers for the development of true entrepreneurs.  Where under Allende 
many cooperatives and associations in the popular classes received contracts and funding 
for products and services from the government who also then purchased those products, 
now many NGOs and faith-based institutions are funding the economic ventures of the 
communities that they work with and buying their products.  In essence, certain popular 
economic ventures have always had guaranteed consumers, and thus a model of state 
paternalism has been substituted for pastoral or third sector paternalism.   
There are multiple problematic effects that this arrangement produces.  One, as 
one Network representative indicated to me, is that producers do not overcome their fear 
and insecurity as entrepreneurs (Maria 10/8/10, interview).  They are not obligated to 
take the risks inherent in starting a business because they know that the institutions that 
train them and organize them also secure them a consumer base.  In the case of one of the 
institutions in the network that works with the poblaciones of La Reina, Peñalolen and 
San Bernardo, when the international NGO funding their work began losing money, they 
were no longer able to buy the producer‟s products for sale in Europe (Maria 10/8/10, 
interview).  Producers had not diversified their clientele.  They also remained too fearful 
of the potential losses they would incur by paying for a space and the needed 
infrastructure at a neighborhood fair.  Consequently, they were largely obligated to return 
to selling their products from their homes (Maria 10/8/10, interview).  As a number of the 
international NGOs represented in the Network are predicated on this model of a 
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guaranteed consumer, it will remain a challenge of the Network to empower producers to 
take the risks inherent in engaging in the market as a producer, even in a collective. 
Another legacy of the neoliberal era that continues to affect the Solidarity 
Economy is the decentralization of services to the municipal level.  This process has 
created great confusion in the Network members as to who, and what, constitutes the 
State.  While it was repeatedly emphasized to me in interviews and meetings that the 
State does not support the Solidarity Economy or associative practices, it also emerged 
that many of the associations in the network indeed receive money from the national 
government‟s FOSIS fund through the nexus of the municipality.  Network members did 
not seem to connect the two events as being contradictory.   
I argue that this is related to the new geography of decentralized services and a 
diffused social movement operating firstly at a neighborhood level.   As health care and 
education were decentralized to the municipality level, so were funds geared toward 
economic development, like those originating from FOSIS.  Members are not aware that 
the money they receive from the municipality is in fact flowing from national initiatives 
and thus for them the State- that is, national-level politicians and political parties- are still 
seen as failing to invest in their activities.  The municipalities, and their local-level 
politicians, are viewed as being responsible for obtaining these funds.  Thus one group, 
CONAMARCH, which operates in La Cisterna, lobbied its alderman for two years for 
funds, and when they were finally granted, it was to his efforts and proclivities that 
members attributed their new financing (Monica 10/12/10, Commission Meeting).  
National rhetoric is still based on individuals and a reduced State, and producers thus 
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attribute their successes in obtaining funds not to political parties and politics at the 
national level, but to the individual receptiveness of their local representatives.   
    
 Figure 4.1 Network Workshops and Associations by Comuna           
 Source: Nomina de Productores, Santiago Solidarity Economy Network  
                            Key:         White  0 Workshops 
        Gray   1-3  
                Teal    4-7 
                 Blue    More than 7                  
              
 The geographically scattered nature of the movement, which challenges efforts to 
create group cohesiveness, is also an obstacle to sharing information and strategies for 
obtaining funds.  Firstly, groups simply do not know what one another have been able to 
procure in terms of financing.  Although many groups are located in the peripheral zones 
of the city, they are also spread throughout almost the entire metropolis, as Figure 1.1 
indicates.  The ability of each group to share their strategies, and successes, is challenged 
by the diffuse geographical nature of the Network.  Secondly, were groups to maintain 
improved communication, their strategies would not necessarily be readily transferable to 
other municipalities.  Each struggle for funds in one neighborhood is not replicable in 
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another, as the funding priorities and political composition of each municipality is not 
identical to every other.  Decentralization has thus obfuscated the target of collective 
actions and isolated those actions from one another due to the nature of their 





















 The communitarian logic of the ISI model was premised on national social 
solidarity that extended significant social services to underprivileged groups and 
increased the political leverage and representation of the working classes in industrial 
sectors.  Norms of cooperation and solidarity were strong.  Furthermore the material 
benefits of these norms were highly evident as universalist systems of service provision 
included everyone in health, education and retirement packages provided by the 
government. 
At the same time, ISI accelerated the marginalization of non-industrial sectors of 
the economy and perpetuated a development model that ignored the social relationships 
embedded in certain types of economies.  Agricultural communities and economic sectors 
producing hand-made goods in particular suffered as a result of ISI, which valued 
industrialization over participation and the machinery of modernization over the primary 
sociality of pre-industrial markets.   While it was a model premised in part on 
egalitarianism, it was not a vehicle for associationalism.   
The application of neoliberal policy in Chile under an authoritarian government 
also had significant impacts on the social solidarity of Chilean citizens.  While solidarity 
in certain classes increased initially as they faced repression from the government, it also 
decreased with the increasing social mistrust brought about by the dictatorship‟s methods 
of social control and the emphasis of the new economic model on individual actors and 
accountability.  Similarly while the retreat of the State led to an increase in associativity 
for survival of the popular classes, the decentralization of what remained confuses efforts 
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to obtain funds and work collectively from associations nested around geographic 
identities.   
Even the return of a civilian center-left government has failed to reinstate a 
community-oriented, universalist system of social service provision.   It has not re-
engaged the enfeebled labor movement or the cooperative sector in a meaningful way.  
Neoliberal economic policy continues even under a progressive government, and the 
rhetoric of modernization goes largely unquestioned by those in political power.   
The Solidarity Economy has emerged to address the failures of these ideologies to 
account for the social nature and consequences of economic activity, as well as to 
maximize the opportunity for a broader, more engaged civil society that a smaller State 
affords.  Through democratic production structures, such as cooperatives, a focus on 
environmentally sustainable initiatives, and promoting responsible consumption, the 
Solidarity Economy is an umbrella movement that unites disparate societal groups to 
actualize a pluralistic vision of the economy.  As it is a movement that is not seeking 
political power, it is prefigurative, embodying the values it endorses in its decision-
making and management processes.   
In Chile this movement has now existed officially for nearly a decade.  It is 
predominantly Christian and Catholic institutions that comprise the Santiago Solidarity 
Economy Network, and principally female artisanal producers making textiles, jewelry 
and foodstuffs that constitute the body of the producer population.  The majority of 
Network institutions were active in the resistance movement under the dictatorship, and 
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the Network representatives from these institutions also belong to the last generation with 
lasting memories of authoritarian rule.   
Neoliberalism in a context of authoritarianism shaped this generation of leftists to 
be oppositional, suspicious of certain sectors of society and the economy, and the State in 
general.  As a result, the Solidarity Economy and the Network institutions that form the 
movement‟s public face are limited in their ability to form new alliances or engage in 
political organizing or lobbying in support of the Solidarity Economy.  In some senses 
they are trapped in an anachronistic paradigm that has not been well adapted to the new 
political or economic climate in which they operate, which leads this group to focus on 
Training processes aimed at consciousness-raising at the expense of preparing the 
popular classes with whom they work to confront the risks of entrepreneurialism, connect 
them to new markets or provide them with more diverse private-sector contacts. 
The strength of a pluralistic movement built on local identities and associations is 
also its weakness.  Geographic, class and cultural diversity complicate efforts to build a 
group identity that will sustain the movement beyond the doors of the institutions that 
have held the movement up for the last ten years.  Social solidarity is challenging to 
foster when producers have little opportunity to forge a collective self because they 
operate in small, municipal level units.   
Furthermore any sense of a common cause is problematic when each association‟s 
struggle with the State for funds or space for fairs is decentralized to the municipal level 
and its particular politicians and that association‟s relationship to them.  There is no 
shared campaign for obtaining resources from the State that would otherwise unite a 
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group, even one so dispersed over a large metropolis.  Without a unifying spatial identity, 
or common oppositional target, the Solidarity Economy in Chile has struggled to 
maintain group cohesion and sustain participation.   
Finally, neoliberalism‟s success at creating a consumerist society, particularly 
through widespread credit availability, is a significant challenge to social solidarity 
because it replaces the social obligations and orientation of reciprocal systems with credit 
from financial institutions.  Neoliberal policy has also created a consumerist government 
in Chile that regards credit as a sufficient substitute for training and education.  At many 
levels it seems that access to capital is deemed as the defining characteristic of economic 
development, a belief that the Solidarity Economy struggles to deconstruct. 
In conclusion, the main barriers to the growth of this movement are related to the 
demography and ideological disposition of the Network institutions and their 
representatives, and to the ability of the Network to unite associations in a city of 7 
million people to form a cohesive group identity and act as one.  The inclusion of 
university students will change the generational composition of the Network and 
therefore may resolve obstacles related to the creation of a broader coalition.  The 
Network also will need to make the most of the few occasions when the producers have 
access to one another and the Network members during general meetings, refocusing 
their efforts at creating channels of communication between associations and undertaking 
activities that further familiarize producers with one another and thus fortify a group 
identity.   
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For an organization with few resources, these challenges are not minimal, yet 
efforts to solve one challenge may lead to resolution of others.  A broader coalition 
generated from rising participation of younger university students may increase funding 
sources as well as alter the tactics of coalition building that the Network thus far has 
undertaken.  Similarly, improved communication between producer associations in 
diverse neighborhoods may also lead to a more organic process of consciousness-raising 
and consolidation of group solidarity than even the most well-designed popular education 
interventions.  Regardless, the Solidarity Economy Network will have to modify its 
approach, searching for new human and financial resources if it wants to become an 
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